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ABSTRACT 
Behavioral ethics research generally suggests that after making a small transgression there is a 
“slippery slope” that leads people to make bigger transgressions in the future (Gino & Bazerman, 
2009; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). In contrast to this dominant lens, I am interested in how 
transgressors might change their behavior after committing an offense, instead of repeating their 
offenses or engaging in more serious offenses. Paper 1 consists of an archival study and an 
experiment that explore how transgressors’ evaluations of their past transgressions influence 
their likelihood of recidivism. Paper 2 consists of a series of five studies (i.e., one survey and 
four experiments) that explore how people’s beliefs about moral character influence their 
motivation to change in the aftermath of wrongdoing. Overall, my dissertation aims to makes 
several theoretical contributions. First, it contributes to the conversation on the downstream 
consequences of wrongdoing, complementing the existing literature’s focus on the antecedents of 
wrongdoing. Second, it adds to the emerging perspective that ethical judgments and decisions are 
person-centered (i.e., moral behaviors are used as cues to make evaluations about the person who 
performed those behaviors). This complements the existing literature’s behavioral or act-
centered perspective. Finally, my dissertation draws attention to the positive change that 
transgressors can experience in the aftermath of wrongdoing.
  1 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Theoretical Contributions 
Although people behave in accordance with their moral principles and personal values 
most of the time, they also commonly engage in behaviors that violate these moral principles and 
values. For example, an individual might be dishonest with someone to gain an advantage, or use 
unfair means to get ahead of others at work. Regardless of the specific behavior and whether the 
individual was caught, one major question is whether or not s/he will repeat this behavior, or 
change for the better. Mankind has pondered this question for centuries, as reflected in the fact 
that many of the world’s religions include teachings on the nature of sin, forgiveness and 
redemption (Ayoub, 1978; Cohen, 1987; Murray, 1955). These common themes address how 
humans deal with the aftermath of their wrongdoing and suggest that it is possible for 
transgressors to change for the better. In my dissertation, I explore how individuals might 
positively change their behavior after committing an offense, instead of repeating their offenses 
or engaging in more serious offenses.  
In my dissertation, I investigate the psychological factors that shape individuals’ attitudes 
and behavior in the aftermath of wrongdoing. Ethics researchers have investigated the individual 
and contextual factors that lead to individuals’ unethical behavior (Moore & Gino, 2015; 
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Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006 for reviews). For example, individual factors such as moral 
awareness (Reynolds, 2006) and moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), and contextual factors 
such as ethical infrastructure (Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe, & Umphress, 2003) and ethical 
leadership (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005) have been linked to (un)ethical decision making 
and conduct. In contrast to the current literature’s focus on antecedents of unethical behavior, 
this dissertation aims to contribute to the conversation about the downstream consequences of 
unethical behavior. Research on the “slippery slope” of unethical behavior (Gino & Bazerman, 
2009; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004; Welsh, Ordóñez, Snyder, & Christian, 2015; Zhang, 
Cornwell, & Higgins, 2014) suggests that after committing a transgression, individuals may 
easily slip into engaging in potentially more serious unethical behavior. In contrast, my 
dissertation focuses on how individuals might change for the better in the aftermath of 
wrongdoing, therefore answering the repeated calls for more research on the recovery process in 
the aftermath of a transgression (Goodstein & Butterfield, 2010; Moore & Gino, 2015; 
Schminke, Caldwell, Ambrose, & McMahon, 2014). 
In my dissertation, I also aim to add to the growing research on a “person-centered” 
approach to moral psychology. Most research in moral psychology has focused on the question 
of how individuals make judgments on whether a particular act or behavior is right or wrong 
(Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012). For instance, some moral psychology researchers compare and 
contrast individuals’ deontological concerns (based on moral principles) and utilitarian concerns 
(based on cost-benefit analyses) when judging immoral actions (Ditto & Liu, 2012; Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Tanner, Medin, & 
Iliev, 2008). Other moral psychology researchers explore the various cognitive and/or affective 
mechanisms that influence individuals’ judgments about whether an act is immoral or not 
  3 
(Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001). All of this work reflects a fundamentally act-based 
approach that is concerned with figuring out the appropriateness of various types of 
transgressions. The acts-based approach attempts to answer the following question: “What 
should I do?” However, a growing stream of has introduced a person-centered approach 
(Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011; Uhlmann, Pizarro & Diermeier, 2015). This 
research stream highlights that individuals judge others’ moral character from their actions. In 
fact, these researchers argue that judgments about morality are not only about immoral acts, they 
are also about what those acts reflect about an agent’s moral values and standards. This 
perspective is consistent with modern and classic virtue ethics philosophies (Anscombe, 1958; 
Aristotle, 4
th
 Century, B.C./2011), which highlight that one’s actions act as clues to one’s 
underlying moral traits. The person-centered approach addresses the following question: “How 
should I live?” How-to-live questions, as opposed to what-to-do questions, have less to do with 
particular actions at a specific point in time, and more to do with one’s general disposition and 
character, and the sequence of life choices one makes over one’s lifespan (Michaelson, 2016). 
My dissertation joins this stream of research and aims to explore how one’s evaluations of one’s 
own moral character might influence one’s future moral behavior. Specifically, I explore how 
one’s future behavior is determined by whether one sees oneself as a moral person (Chapter 2), 
or as having fixed or malleable moral character (Chapter 3).  
Finally, this dissertation features an adaptive and constructive approach to understanding 
wrongdoing. Research in psychology suggests that successful cognitive processing of traumatic 
events can lead to post-traumatic growth (Calhoun, Cann, Tedeschi, & McMillan, 2000; Calhoun 
& Tedeschi, 2006; Maitlis, 2009; Park & Helgeson, 2006; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004; Watkins, 
2008). Related research (Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Kross, Gard, Deldin, Clifton, & Ayduk, 2012) 
  4 
suggests that people are able to make positive meaning out of their negative experiences. In the 
spirit of this work, this dissertation aims to explore how positive outcomes might emerge from 
the negativity of wrongdoing. This view adds an important moral dimension to the current 
research on learning from failure (Ellis, Carette, Anseel, & Lievens, 2014; Myers, Staats, & 
Gino, 2014), suggesting that learning might emerge from moral failures, not just task failures. 
The moral development and growth that occurs in the aftermath of moral failures is novel 
because it is not just about the acquisition of new insights or knowledge, but also involves a re-
evaluation and re-alignment of one’s moral values. Therefore, it is important to better understand 
the dynamics underlying these unique processes. 
1.2 Definitions and Scope Conditions 
This dissertation takes an inclusive view of wrongdoing, and uses the term wrongdoing 
interchangeably with transgression, offense, infraction, misconduct and unethical behavior, as is 
typical in the literature. In addition, like in Treviño et al. (2006), the terms moral and ethical are 
used interchangeably. Wrongdoing is broadly defined as acts that violate widely held moral 
principles, such as fairness and care for others. Since care for others is one of the central moral 
principles (Haidt, 2012), interpersonal transgressions (i.e., those that involve inflicting harm on a 
victim, such as saying something hurtful to someone) also fall within the scope of this definition. 
Furthermore, my dissertation considers a wide range of transgressions such as dishonesty, 
cheating, theft, or harming others. Although each specific type of transgression might have a 
nuanced definition that distinguishes it from other types of transgressions, there is a lot of 
overlap in terms of the specific behaviors they cover and they generally have similar effects on 
individuals (Robinson, Wang, & Kiewitz, 2016). Therefore, I do not focus on their differences in 
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my dissertation, and instead concentrate more on developing a broad understanding on what 
generally happens in the aftermath of all kinds of transgressions.  
Importantly, this dissertation examines wrongdoing that is limited to situations in which 
(a) the wrongdoing is severe enough that the wrongdoer is aware that the behavior is 
questionable and might consider changing his or her future behavior and (b) the wrongdoing is 
not so severe that there is close to no chance of recidivism. These scope conditions are not 
excessively restrictive and should include most situations that occur in organizations. My 
theorizing is also limited to situations where transgressors are aware that they have committed an 
act that is considered ethically inappropriate, improper, or questionable. Others may not 
necessarily be aware of the transgression, and the transgressor may not necessarily have been 
punished for his or her behavior. Therefore, these may be private transgressions that only the 
transgressor himself or herself knows of, that the transgressor has not been punished for, but that 
the transgressor feels are at least somewhat unethical. Even when transgressors feel that their 
actions are justified or reasonable, they only engage in those cognitions when they first realize 
that they may have done something ethically questionable. 
Many positive outcomes can emerge in the aftermath of wrongdoing. For example, 
transgressors might show repentance by publicly accounting for their actions (Bies, 1987; Bies & 
Shapiro, 1987), apologize to those affected (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & 
Dirks, 2004), compensate victims (Desmet, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2011; Okimoto & Tyler, 
2007), and seek reconciliation (Andiappan & Treviño, 2010; Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001, 
2006). Some individuals might even be spurred to engage in generative behavior (McAdams & 
de St. Aubin, 1992; McAdams, Hart, & Maruan, 1998), such as advising others to help others 
learn from their mistakes (Effron & Miller, 2015). These examples represent all the ways that the 
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literature has examined how wrongdoers might constructively respond after committing a 
transgression. However, I contend that the most constructive response in the aftermath of 
wrongdoing is for wrongdoers to not repeat their previous transgression. Corporate ethical 
scandals have often been described as resulting from repeated small infractions that accumulate 
over time (e.g., Kirchner, 2010; McLean & Elkind, 2003). Thus, recidivism is costly and 
consequential for organizations. Nonetheless, reducing recidivism can help prevent day-to-day 
transgressions from blowing up into costly business scandals. Therefore, my dissertation focuses 
on reducing recidivism, or not repeating a transgression, as the outcome.  
1.3 Summary 
This dissertation will empirically explore factors that might reduce wrongdoers’ 
recidivism in the aftermath of wrongdoing. Specifically, Paper 1 teases apart the act-centered and 
person-centered judgments that wrongdoers make when evaluating their wrongdoing, and 
explores how they interact to influence wrongdoers’ likelihood of recidivism. Paper 2 focuses on 
wrongdoers’ beliefs about the malleability of their moral character, and examines the role of 
reflection and motivation to change in reducing their likelihood of recidivism. 
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Chapter 2:  
Act-Centered and Person-Centered Judgments in the Aftermath of Wrongdoing 
 
2.1 Theoretical Development 
As described in the previous chapter, after wrongdoing has been committed, wrongdoers 
are generally expected to repeat that wrongdoing (Gino & Bazerman, 2009; Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004; Welsh, Ordóñez, Snyder, & Christian, 2015; Zhang, Cornwell, & Higgins, 2014). 
In the business context, repeat transgressions may occur when individuals repeatedly over-report 
their sales figures to meet performance targets (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), repeatedly 
overstate firm earnings in financial reports (Schrand & Zechman, 2012), or repeatedly accept or 
offer bribes (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). These minor but frequently recurring transgressions may 
escalate over time into large scandals that damage the reputation and performance of 
organizations in which these transgressions take place. Welsh and colleagues (2015) argue that 
the slippery slope of unethical behavior is likely the result of a process of rationalization over 
time, whereby transgressions are justified through cognitive misconstrual of the nature of those 
transgressions and the extent of their consequences. Zhang and colleagues (2014) offer a slightly 
different explanation – they argue that the slippery slope of unethical behavior is the result of 
transgressors’ concern with maintaining the status quo. In my dissertation, I hope to question 
these current views on the inevitability of recidivism. My overarching goal is to investigate the 
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psychological factors that that might influence transgressors’ recidivism, or the likelihood of 
them repeating their transgression. 
Changing one’s behavior is often a goal-driven process of self-regulation (Bandura, 
1991). Therefore, reducing recidivism involves a motivational process where the transgressor 
sets a goal of not repeating a transgression and strives to achieve that goal. Various theories of 
work motivation describe how individuals’ motivation to perform a behavior depends on how 
they evaluate the valence or value of the behavior, as well as the expectancy or expectation that 
they are actually capable of performing the behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Atkinson, 1964; Feather, 
1982; Lawler & Porter, 1967; Vroom, 1964). Some motivation theories, such as Feather’s (1982) 
expectancy-value theory, focus primarily on valence and expectancy as the two main 
components of motivation. Other motivation theories, such as Vroom’s (1964) expectancy 
theory, focus on three components: valence, expectancy and instrumentality. Instrumentality 
refers to how individuals evaluate their likelihood of attaining a certain reward as a result of 
performing a behavior. In this chapter, I adopt the deontological perspective that moral behavior 
should be performed as an end in itself (i.e., that moral behavior is performed as the outcome or 
reward itself), rather than the consequentialist perspective that moral behavior should be 
performance as a means to an end (i.e., that moral behavior is performed to achieve the best 
outcomes for all, or for some financial or social reward). The deontological view makes the 
instrumentality component of motivation less relevant since I view the performance of moral 
behavior as equivalent to the outcome or reward (for further explanation of the difference 
between deontological and consequentialist perspectives on morality, see Tanner, Medin, & 
Iliev, 2007). Therefore, I focus in particular on the valence and expectancy components of 
motivation, and leave out the instrumentality component. In this chapter, I apply theoretical 
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insights from expectancy-valence motivational frameworks to understand how people evaluate 
their past moral transgressions and how these evaluations influence their motivation to not repeat 
those transgressions. Therefore, this chapter integrates insights from the work motivation 
literature and the moral psychology literature to explore the different ways in which wrongdoers 
evaluate their past transgressions, and what these evaluations mean for their motivation to 
change their behavior.  
Research in moral psychology suggests that when making moral judgments of others’ 
behaviors, people distinguish between act-centered moral judgments and person-centered moral 
judgments (e.g., Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012; Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). Act-
centered moral judgments are focused on the permissibility of the transgression, while person-
centered moral judgments are focused on the transgressor’s moral character, or his or her moral 
traits and dispositions. Moral psychology has traditionally focused on the act-centered approach 
– how people assess the permissibility of acts – as characterized by debates on trolley problems 
and considerations of the acceptability or severity of immoral acts based on rule-based versus 
utilitarian concerns (e.g., Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Recent perspectives argue that people also use others’ behaviors as 
cues to make inferences about what others are like. In fact, there is strong empirical evidence that 
people’s judgments of moral acts can be dissociated from their judgments of moral character 
(Inbar, Pizarro, & Cushman, 2012; Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & Uhlmann, 2012; Tannenbaum, 
Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011; Uhlmann & Zhu, 2013; Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum, 2013).  
At least for third-party evaluations of observed acts, which the literature has largely been 
focused on, considerations of control and intentionality appear to influence the relationship 
between act-centered and person-centered judgments (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012). For 
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example, if a person has absolutely no control over an action (e.g., was forced to commit the 
transgression), or if the person did not intentionally commit the transgression, then the act is less 
indicative of that person’s underlying moral character. However, an act that is evaluated as 
relatively harmless can nonetheless be evaluated as highly indicative of a person’s immorality 
when it was committed intentionally and when the person had full control over the act. 
Therefore, the act-person distinction in moral judgments would suggest four possible 
combinations of act-centered and person-centered judgments. First, an act may be evaluated as 
extremely unethical and as highly indicative of a person’s immorality. For example, intentionally 
causing serious injury to someone would fall in this category. Second, an act may be evaluated as 
extremely unethical but less indicative of a person’s immorality. For example, accidentally 
causing serious injury to someone would fall in this category. Third, an act may be evaluated as 
relatively harmless, yet highly indicative of a person’s immorality. For example, intentionally 
causing minor injury to someone would fall in this category. Fourth, an act may be evaluated as 
relatively harmless and also not indicative of a person’s immorality. For example, accidentally 
causing minor injury to someone would fall in this category. 
Most of the work described above uses vignette-style experiments to study how observers 
evaluate a hypothetical person’s immoral actions. However, it is also important to understand 
how individuals make sense of their own past immoral actions. For instance, a person who has 
committed a transgression might wonder about how permissible his or her actions were, and also 
what that transgression signals about himself or herself as a person. I argue that after committing 
a transgression, transgressors make both act-centered judgments about what they did and person-
centered judgments about who they are. These judgments can be distinguished and have different 
motivational implications. They correspond with the expectancy-valence motivational 
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frameworks discussed earlier – act-centered judgments determine the valence or value placed on 
not repeating the transgression, while person-centered judgments determine the expectancy or 
expectation that they have the ability to not repeat the transgression. In the sections below, I 
describe how act-centered judgment and person-centered judgment of a transgression 
independently and jointly influence transgressors’ motivation to not repeat the transgression. 
Act-Centered Moral Judgments  
When making act-centered judgments of a particular transgression they committed, 
transgressors consider the extent to which their behavior was inappropriate and whether there is 
any value or reason to not repeat that transgression. This corresponds with the valence 
component of the expectancy-valence motivational frameworks discussed earlier. Valence relates 
to why or whether one would be motivated to set a particular goal. In simple terms, valence 
provides a reason to strive for a particular goal (Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). Act-centered 
judgments of past transgressions concern the value that transgressors place on not repeating their 
transgressions. Transgressors need to have a compelling reason to not repeat a transgression and 
need to see value associated with not repeating their transgression.  
Act-centered judgments involve considerations about “the acceptability or permissibility 
of a given behavior” (Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011, p. 1250) from the perspective 
of the evaluator. In a deontological approach, actions are considered morally unacceptable or 
impermissible if they violate one’s moral duties or obligations. This view implies that 
transgressors will accept moral responsibility for their actions when they know they had the 
ability to do otherwise (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012, p. 94). Theories of responsibility and 
blame suggest that transgressors might accept responsibility for their transgression when they 
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believe they did it intentionally and played a causal role in the outcome (Malle & Knobe, 1997; 
Shaver, 1985), or when they had control over the outcome (Alicke, 2000; Schlenker, Britt, 
Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994; Weiner, 1995). This process of self-blame that is focused 
on evaluations of various aspects of one’s actions is what Janoff-Bulman (1979) calls behavioral 
self-blame. Behavioral self-blame involves the belief that one’s behavior is inappropriate, and 
leads to considerations about how the behavior should be corrected in the future. In short, when 
transgressors believe they played a causal role in committing the transgression and had control 
over it, they feel a sense of moral responsibility for their past transgression. As they accept moral 
responsibility for their actions and view their actions as not acceptable or permissible, they are 
more likely to believe it is important and valuable to not repeat that transgression in the future. 
Therefore, they will be less likely to repeat the transgression. 
Conversely, when transgressors engage in moral disengagement, they evaluate their 
transgression as acceptable or permissible.
1
 Moral disengagement is a cognitive process that 
deactivates moral self-regulation, allowing individuals to circumvent their internalized moral 
standards (Bandura, 1990, 1999). Moral disengagement has been depicted as a collection of 
mechanisms that allow wrongdoers to disengage their actions from moral self-censure (Bandura, 
Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). For example, they might reframe the harmful 
behavior as benevolent or well intentioned. They might also reduce personal accountability for 
the transgression, and shift the responsibility for the transgression to other parties. When 
transgressors morally disengage from their transgression through the various mechanisms 
described above, they view their actions as acceptable or permissible, and there is no need 
                                                             
1
 I view moral responsibility and moral disengagement as existing on the same continuum, with moral responsibility 
on one end of the continuum and moral disengagement on the other end of the continuum.  
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compelling reason for them to not repeat the transgression. Therefore, they will be more likely to 
repeat the transgression. 
Hypothesis 1: Transgressors’ act-centered judgments of their past transgressions 
influence their likelihood of recidivism, such that those who take moral responsibility for their 
actions have a lower likelihood of recidivism than those who morally disengage from their 
actions. 
Person-Centered Moral Judgments  
Beyond having a compelling reason to not repeat a transgression, transgressors also need 
to feel personally capable of doing so. This is where person-centered judgments come into play. 
Person-centered judgments involve considerations about what the transgression signals about the 
transgressor’s ability to act morally (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012). When transgressors make 
person-centered judgments of a particular transgression they themselves committed, they 
consider what their behavior signals about themselves, and therefore whether they personally 
have what it takes to not repeat their transgression. Indeed, self-perception theory asserts that 
people develop their self-perceptions from observations of their own recent behavior (Bem, 
1972). It is important to note that, here, person-centered moral judgments refer to the evaluations 
transgressors make about themselves based on a particular transgression, rather than their global 
self-evaluations that are not anchored around any particular transgression. In the current 
literature, person-centered moral judgments are examined as a third party’s evaluation of a 
person based on a particular transgression that person committed. Similarly, when it comes to 
self-evaluations, I conceptualize person-centered moral judgments as one’s evaluation of oneself 
based on a particular transgression that one has committed. These moral self-evaluations, 
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anchored around a particular transgression, inform their thoughts about whether they have the 
ability to act morally in the future. These evaluations correspond with the expectancy component 
of the expectancy-valence motivational frameworks discussed earlier. Expectancy relates to 
perceptions of self-efficacy, or beliefs in one’s ability to achieve goals (Bandura, 1977). Thus, 
person-centered judgments of past transgressions relate to the self-efficacy that transgressors 
have in being able to not repeat the transgression.  
After committing a transgression, people may infer that they lack the ability to act 
morally, resulting in negative moral self-evaluations. For example, they may attribute their 
transgressions to personal flaws (Janoff-Bulman, 1979). When these character deficits are 
believed to be relatively stable, global and unchangeable, they might feel incapable of changing 
their behavior. Seeing oneself as having poor moral character may lead to diminished self-esteem 
and a sense of helplessness (Janoff-Bulman, 1979). Furthermore, transgressors may experience 
shame when they evaluate themselves negatively in the aftermath of a transgression (Tangney, 
1990; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Because 
shame is associated with the feeling that one is defective at one’s core, it often results in an 
avoidance orientation, driving people’s desire to hide, withdraw or disappear (Haidt, 2003). This 
helplessness or passivity in correcting one’s perceived faults means that transgressors may not be 
motivated to change their behavior. Furthermore, research on self-verification suggests that 
people desire to confirm and validate their self-views, even if their self-views are negative 
(Swann, 1983, 1987). For example, people with negative self-views prefer to interact with 
partners who have unfavorable impressions of them and they solicit feedback that confirms their 
negative self-views (e.g., Swann, De La Ronde, & Hixon, 1994; Swann, Stein-Seroussi, & 
Giesler, 1992). They may intentionally behave in ways to elicit self-verifying responses from 
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others (Brockner, 1985; Swann & Read, 1981). Therefore, when individuals make negative 
moral self-evaluations, they may further behave in ways (e.g., repeat a transgression) that 
confirm their negative self-views.  
On the other hand, others may infer that despite the recent transgression, they still possess 
the ability to act morally. They may continue to maintain a positive view of their moral selves 
(Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Shalvi, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011), resulting in positive moral 
self-evaluations.
2
 For example, instead of internalizing the recent transgression, they might 
remember experiences in the past when they behaved in an ethical way or times when they were 
commended for their moral traits, and thus interpret their recent transgression as an outlier that 
does not represent whether they are an immoral person. As transgressors observe the negative 
consequences that their transgression has had on others, they might also reinforce their moral 
identity, which refers to the importance they place on being people who possess moral traits and 
dispositions (Aquino & Reed, 2002). In these ways, transgressors are able to make positive 
moral self-evaluations. Although moral licensing theory (e.g., Monin & Miller, 2001) would 
suggest that positive moral self-evaluations license one to act immorally in future, I subscribe to 
a moral consistency perspective that individuals tend to act in a manner that is consistent with 
their self-concept (e.g., Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Blasi, 1980).
3
 When they 
evaluate themselves positively, they strengthen their beliefs that they have the necessary 
personality traits and dispositions to change their behavior. As a result, they will be less likely to 
repeat the transgression. 
                                                             
2
 I view positive moral self-evaluations and negative moral self-evaluations as existing on the same continuum, with 
positive moral self-evaluations on one end of the continuum and negative moral self-evaluations on the other end of 
the continuum. 
3
 Several researchers have explored moderators influencing when moral consistency occurs, as opposed to moral 
licensing (e.g., Conway & Peetz, 2012; Joosten, van Dijke, Van Hiel, & De Creamer, 2014; Schnall & Roper, 2012). 
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Hypothesis 2: Transgressors’ person-centered judgments of their past transgressions 
influence their likelihood of recidivism, such that those who make positive moral self-evaluations 
have a lower likelihood of recidivism than those who make negative moral self-evaluations. 
Combining Act-Centered and Person-Centered Moral Judgments  
Classic theories of motivation argue that motivation towards goals is the result of 
interactions of valences and expectancies (Feather, 1982; Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 
1944; Tolman, 1955; Vroom, 1964).
4
 These multiplicative models of motivation suggest that as 
valence (i.e., value placed on the goal) increases, the impact of expectancy (i.e., one’s efficacy 
beliefs about reaching the goal) on motivation increases. The greater the value that individuals 
place on a particular goal (act-centered), the more sensitized they become to considering how 
they themselves have the ability to reach that goal (person-centered). In the context of moral 
transgressions, I argue that when individuals accept moral responsibility for their actions (act-
centered), this heightens their sensitivity to their self-evaluations about whether they have the 
ability to act morally (person-centered). In contrast, moral disengagement (act-centered) reduces 
their sensitivity to their moral self-evaluations (person-centered). In other words, act-centered 
judgments moderate the relationship between person-centered judgments and likelihood of 
recidivism. 
When individuals feel a sense of moral responsibility for their actions, they might 
experience a heightened sense of moral awareness (Butterfield, Treviño & Weaver, 2000). This 
heightened moral awareness leads them to be more likely to view themselves and their future 
                                                             
4
 Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory proposed that motivation is the result of interactions of three components: 
valences, expectancies and instrumentalities. However, as described earlier on page 11, I adopt a deontological 
perspective that moral behavior should be performed as an end in itself, rather than a means to an end. Therefore, the 
instrumentality component is less relevant to my theorizing.  
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decisions and actions through a moral lens. As their sense of identity becomes more closely tied 
to their sense of morality (Aquino & Reed, 2002), I argue that their behavior will be more likely 
to be influenced by their moral self-evaluations and considerations about whether they have the 
ability to change their moral behavior. In contrast, when individuals morally disengage from 
their actions, they might experience a process of amoralization, whereby their attitudes towards 
themselves and their future actions and decisions become devoid of any moral relevance or 
meaning (Lucas & Waytz, 2014). In other words, their sense of self-worth becomes decoupled 
from their sense of morality, and their behavior will be less likely to be influenced by their moral 
self-evaluations. In sum, I propose that transgressors’ act-centered judgments moderate the 
relationship between person-centered judgments and likelihood of recidivism, such that moral 
responsibility strengthens this relationship while moral disengagement weakens this relationship. 
Hypothesis 3: Act-centered judgments moderate the link between person-centered 
judgments and likelihood of recidivism. Specifically, moral responsibility strengthens the 
relationship between person-centered judgments and likelihood of recidivism, while moral 
disengagement weakens the relationship. 
2.2 Study 1  
 
 
Context and Data 
 
The context of Study 1 is athletes’ public statements in response to their suspensions in 
the top four sports leagues in the United States – National Football League (NFL), National 
Basketball Association (NBA), National Hockey League (NHL) and Major League Baseball 
(MLB). Specifically, I explore whether the act-centered and person-centered judgments that 
athletes make in their responses to their suspensions influence their likelihood of being 
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suspended again. The sports context is especially conducive for exploring my research question 
because the enhanced public attention on athletes leads their wrongdoings to come to the fore 
more frequently than in other typical work settings. Since information about sports suspensions 
is generally openly reported in the news, I was able to collect rich data.   
The sports context bears many similarities to other work contexts. In many competitive 
workplaces, individuals feel strong tensions between their performance concerns, status concerns 
and integrity concerns. Likewise, in sports, doing the right thing and playing by the rules is not 
always aligned with performing well or attaining status. In many business organizations, there 
are grey areas about what behaviors are appropriate in order to get ahead; formal disciplinary 
policies are often vague and open to interpretation, and organizational norms and senior leaders 
may even endorse improper actions. Similarly, there are grey areas in sports about what 
behaviors are subject to punishment and what behaviors are just “part of the game.” 
Nevertheless, there are several ways that the sports context is not like a typical organizational 
context. When players are suspended, they receive more public scrutiny as compared to when 
regular employees are punished for their transgressions. Suspended players are accountable to 
multiple parties: their teammates, coach, the league, fans, and the media. However, depending on 
the severity of the work transgression, employees who are punished may only need to be 
accountable to those they personally know: their direct supervisor or close peers.  
Data about players’ suspensions were obtained from a publicly shared database from 
Spotrac. Spotrac is an online sports system for data on team payrolls, player contracts, salaries 
and other relevant information. The suspensions database includes information about 318 NFL 
suspensions (2002 – present), 233 NHL suspensions (2010 – present), 191 MLB suspensions 
(2009 – present), and 162 NBA suspensions (2010 – present), aggregating to a total of 904 
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suspension committed by 728 players across the four sports. The data include information about 
the date of the suspension, length of the suspension, suspension fees (if any) and the reason for 
the suspension. 
I collected online news articles about all 904 suspensions. Given that sports suspensions 
are not systematically reported by any one news outlet, I used a multi-source approach to collect 
news articles about each suspension. News articles about each suspension were obtained from 
multiple sports news websites (e.g., espn.com, sbnation.com, si.com, bleacherreport.com, 
cbssports.com, foxsports.com, sportingnews.com, usatoday.com/sports, sports.yahoo.com), the 
respective sports league websites (i.e., nfl.com, nhl.com, mlb.com, nba.com), as well as the 
respective team city’s news websites (e.g., nydailynews.com for New York Yankees, 
chicagotribune.com for Chicago Bears). Given the strong Canadian representation in the NHL, I 
also looked at Canadian websites (e.g., sportsnet.ca, cbc.ca) for suspensions from this league.   
For each suspension, using the Google search engine, I visited the news websites listed 
above to search for news articles about the suspension, paying particular attention to news 
articles containing public statements made by the player. Using this approach, I searched for and 
collected news articles about each suspension, extracting any quotes from the public statement 
made by the suspended player. In some cases, the exact same public statement would appear 
across news articles from different news sources. For such cases, extracting the public statement 
was relatively straightforward. In other cases, news articles from different news sources would 
contain different segments of a public statement (although they concern the same suspension), 
with either no overlap or varying degrees of overlap across news articles. For such cases, I 
combined all the different segments of a public statement the player made about his suspension 
from different sources. I continued collecting new segments until a saturation point was reached 
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where nearly all new news articles contained segments of the public statement that I already 
collected through other news articles. Given that my focus is on extracting specific quotes 
contained within news articles rather than identifying entire news articles based on a key word 
search, my approach of manually browsing through multiple news websites allowed me to gather 
more comprehensive and accurate data than pulling up articles from an electronic database like 
LexisNexis by entering a limited number of key words. 
In terms of extracting player statements, I focused only on direct quotations from the 
player that appeared in the news articles (i.e., statements made by the player that appear within 
quotation marks). Only quotes in response to the suspension were extracted; quotes about 
tangential issues that appeared in the same news article were not extracted. Some news articles 
embedded videos of the player making his public account. In these cases, the videos were 
manually transcribed verbatim.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Offenders.  In the data, there were a total of 728 players who received a total of 907 
suspensions. Of the 728 players found in the data, 610 (83.79%) are one-time offenders (i.e., 
only one suspension) and 118 (16.21%) are repeat offenders (i.e., multiple suspensions). All 
players in this sample were male. 
Suspensions. Of the 904 total suspensions found in the data, 728 (80.53%) are first-time 
suspensions and the remaining 176 (19.47%) are repeat suspensions. I reviewed the disciplinary 
policies of the four sports leagues to familiarize myself with the context of my data (Major 
League Baseball, 2016; National Basketball Association, 2015; National Football League, 2015; 
National Hockey League, 2015). Across the four sports, suspensions typically fall into one or 
more of the following categories: performance-enhancing drugs violation (17%), substance 
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abuse violation (e.g., use of marijuana; 19%), player safety violation (e.g., hitting or striking 
another player; 43%), umpire-related violation (e.g., physical contact with umpire; 5%), conduct 
detrimental to team violation (e.g., skipping practice, skipping games; 4%), personal conduct 
violation (e.g., domestic abuse, hit and run; 8%) and other miscellaneous violations (e.g., 
harming a fan, making homophobic slurs; 5%) 
 Public statements. I found players’ statements for 47.6% of suspensions (N = 430 out of 
904). 80.9% of the 430 statements were for first-time suspensions, while the remaining were for 
repeat suspensions. On average, a player’s public statement contained 106 words.  
Content Analysis 
 Using the textual data collected on 430 players’ public statements, I conducted a content 
analysis to identify when players were making act-centered and person-centered judgments about 
their suspension. The statements were coded on two dimensions. On the first dimension, act-
centered judgments, statements were either coded as 1 for moral responsibility, or zero for moral 
disengagement. On the second dimension, person-centered judgments, statements were coded as 
1 for positive moral self, or zero for negative moral self.  
Act-centered judgments. This variable was coded as 1 when the player’s public 
statement contained examples of how they took personal responsibility for their actions. For 
example, “…I am not here to make excuses for my conduct…how I conduct myself is my 
responsibility…” and “…I take full responsibility for putting myself in this situation... I 
understand the rules and accept my punishment…” were coded as 1.  
However, this variable was coded as zero when the player’s public statement contained 
examples of how they tried to justify their behavior, downplay the negative consequences of 
their behavior and/or shift responsibility to other parties or circumstances. For example, “…It 
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was more like a reflex thing...I wasn't targeting his head or trying to injure him. It was a quick 
play that happened…, ” “…It was just a heat of the moment thing at the time…,” “…I did not use 
steroids or any other substance that would enhance performance….I felt bloated after eating 
Chinese food and ingested a pill that turned out to be a diuretic…,” “…It's the game of hockey 
and I play that style of game…” and “…I think unfortunately the league's protecting certain 
players and making it not that old-school, prestigious way of baseball…” were coded as zero.  
Person-centered judgments. This variable was coded as 1 when the player’s public 
statement contained positive expressions about their moral self. These statements typically 
appealed to their pride in their values and principles. For example, “…My parents brought me up 
with strong values as far as how you represent yourself and the family…,” “…I've prided myself 
for a long time to stay within the lines…,” and “…In my 12 years in the NFL, I have taken 
tremendous pride in upholding the integrity of the NFL shield and all that it entails…” were 
coded as 1.  
However, this variable was coded as zero when the player’s public statement contained 
negative expressions about their moral self. These statements typically revealed their shame or 
disappointment in themselves. For example, “…it makes me feel like a bag of garbage…,” 
“…I’m disappointed in myself because I feel like I let people down…,” and “…I was stupid…” 
were coded as zero.  Although some of these statements appear to be more generally about self-
evaluations rather than moral self-evaluations, I consider them moral self-evaluations since these 
statements were expressed in the context of a suspension. 
Recidivism. This variable was coded as 1 when the player received multiple suspensions, 
and zero when he received only one suspension. This coding was derived from quantitative data 
on each player’s history of suspensions. 
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Type of sports and suspension. I also coded for sports type (e.g., NFL, NHL) and 
suspension type (e.g., performance-enhancing drugs violation, player safety violation). 
Inter-coder agreement. After creating a codebook explaining the coding schemes that I 
used, I hired two research assistants (RAs) to code the data based on the coding scheme. The 
RAs were blind to the hypotheses of this study and coded the statements independently using 
guidelines in the codebook. The coding by the two RAs showed a high level of inter-coder 
reliability (> .90). In all of the cases in which there was disagreement, the RAs discussed the 
disagreement and made the final decision regarding the appropriate code. 
Results 
 Given that all independent and dependent variables are binary categorical variables, I 
analyzed the data using Pearson’s chi-squared tests. I only conducted analyses on players’ 
statements on their first suspensions (N = 348), which were either the player’s only suspension 
(i.e., the player was not suspended again) or followed by subsequent suspensions (i.e., the player 
was suspended again). Across all players and sports, the average likelihood of recidivism was 
16.7% (SD = .37). 
I first ran some initial analyses to explore if there were any general differences between 
players who were suspended again and those who were not suspended again. In terms of type of 
sport, recidivism was not significantly more likely to appear in the NFL, χ2(1) = .48, p = .55, Φ = 
.04, NHL, χ2(1) = .13, p = .72, Φ = .02, MLB, χ2(1) = .05, p = .83, Φ = .01, or NBA, χ2(1) = .70, 
p = .40, Φ = .05, suggesting repeat suspensions was not more common in any one sport. Players 
who were not suspended again were not significantly more likely to have had shorter first 
suspensions in terms of number of games or weeks suspended (b = -.00, SE = .00, t = -1.04, p = 
.30), suggesting that the magnitude of punishment of the first offense did not influence players’ 
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likelihood of recidivism. Finally, players who were not suspended again were not significantly 
more likely to make longer statements in terms of the number of words (b = .00, SE = .00, t = -
1.08, p = .28), suggesting that those who had only one suspension did not differ from those who 
had multiple suspensions in terms of the extent to which they felt they needed to account to the 
public about their initial suspensions. 
 Main effects. Across all sports and types of suspensions, the main effect of act-centered 
judgments on likelihood of recidivism was not significant, χ2(1) = .40, p = .53, Φ = .04. Players 
who expressed moral responsibility had a 15.2% likelihood of recidivism and those who 
expressed moral disengagement had a 18.2% likelihood of recidivism, but these differences were 
not significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 about the influence of act-centered judgments on 
likelihood of recidivism was not supported. 
However, the main effect of person-centered judgments on likelihood of recidivism was 
significant, χ2(1) = 7.70, p = .01, Φ = .25. Players who spoke positively about themselves had a 
12.0% likelihood of recidivism and those who spoke negatively about themselves had a 32.6% 
likelihood of recidivism. This finding supports Hypothesis 2 about the influence of person-
centered judgments on likelihood of recidivism. 
Interaction effects. Results suggest that act-centered judgments moderated the 
relationship between person-centered judgments and likelihood of recidivism (see Figure 2.1). 
When players expressed moral responsibility, person-centered judgments had a significant 
influence on likelihood of recidivism, χ2(1) = 4.18, p = .04, Φ = .28. Those who spoke positively 
about themselves had a 8.3% likelihood of recidivism and those who spoke negatively about 
themselves had a 30.8% likelihood of recidivism. However, when players expressed moral 
disengagement, person-centered judgments did not have a significant influence on likelihood of 
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recidivism, χ2(2) = 2.15, p = .34, Φ = .12. Those who spoke positively about themselves had a 
12.8% likelihood of recidivism and those who spoke negatively about themselves had a 30.8% 
likelihood of recidivism, but these values were not significantly different. In short, these findings 
show support for Hypothesis 3 that act-centered judgments moderate the relationship between 
person-centered judgments and likelihood of recidivism. 
 
Figure 2.1: Interaction between Act-Centered and Person-Centered Judgments in Study 1. 
 
 
Robustness Checks 
For recent first suspensions (e.g., those occurring two months prior to the study data 
collection), not enough time may have elapsed for the player to be suspended again. Therefore, I 
re-ran analyses on only the first suspensions that occurred at least one year prior to the study data 
collection, which gives sufficient time for players to be suspended more than once (N = 294). 
The results do no change with this stricter procedure. I found support for Hypotheses 2 and 3 and 
no support for Hypothesis 1. 
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I conducted additional analyses to see if there were differences in results among types of 
sports and suspensions. However, analyzing the data this way would lead to inaccurate 
inferences being drawn from the chi-squared tests. Chi-squared tests are sensitive to small 
expected frequencies in one or more of the cells, so inferences that are drawn from chi-squared 
test that have expected counts of five or less per cell are often inaccurate (Dixon & Massey, 
1969). In these data, for example, analyzing the interaction effects for cases in the NFL versus 
cases not in the NFL would lead to expected counts (statistically computed based on projected 
frequencies) as low as .8 and 2.2 in some cells, making any inferences from such analyses 
problematic.  
 
Table 2.1: Summary of Hypotheses and Findings in Study 1. 
Hypotheses Findings 
H1 Main effect of act-centered judgments Not Supported 
H2 Main effect of person-centered judgments Supported 
H3 Act-centered judgments moderate the main effect of 
person-centered judgments  
Supported 
 
Discussion 
Overall, the results suggest that players’ person-centered judgments (i.e., how they 
evaluated themselves) were significantly related to their likelihood of recidivism, supporting 
Hypothesis 2. Those who spoke positively about themselves had a lower likelihood of recidivism 
than those who spoke negatively about themselves. As theorized earlier, it is possible that 
positive moral self-evaluations increase individuals’ self-efficacy in terms of their ability to act 
morally in the future. Their sense of efficacy or confidence drives their actual future moral 
behavior, and they are less likely to repeat their transgression. However, due to the negative 
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consequences of shame and self-verification, when individuals make negative moral self-
evaluations, they are more likely to repeat their transgressions. 
Furthermore, players’ act-centered judgments (i.e., how they evaluated their actions) 
moderated the main effect of their person-centered judgments on their likelihood of recidivism, 
supporting Hypothesis 3. When players expressed moral responsibility for their actions, their 
person-centered judgments significantly and negatively influenced their likelihood of recidivism; 
when they expressed moral disengagement from their actions, their person-centered judgments 
did not significantly influence their likelihood of recidivism. In my earlier theorizing, I proposed 
that moral responsibility heightens individuals’ moral awareness, which makes them more 
attentive to and susceptible to their moral self-evaluations. However, the results for Study 1 
suggest that there may be a particular “virtuous synergy” that emerges when individuals take 
moral responsibility for their actions and they evaluate themselves positively (double positive). 
When individuals take moral responsibility for their actions, their positive moral self-evaluations 
become particularly influential in driving their future moral behavior. From this perspective, 
moral responsibility not only increases individuals’ sensitivity to their moral self-evaluations in 
general, but it specifically increases individuals’ sensitivity to their positive moral self-
evaluations. 
However, players’ act-centered judgments did not have a main effect on their likelihood 
of recidivism as predicted in Hypothesis 1. This is theoretically consistent with some 
researchers’ arguments that person-centered judgments are more consequential than act-centered 
judgments (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012), which is why they propose the person-centered 
approach as an alternative, rather than a complement, to the act-centered approach. These 
researchers argue that people are primarily concerned with evaluating others’ character traits. 
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When it comes to self-evaluations, individuals’ tendency to make person-centered judgments 
may be driven by their innate and universal desire to understand and define themselves (Leary & 
Tangney, 2011). Their actions themselves matter less than what their actions signal about who 
they are, and their self-perceptions play an influential role in driving their future behavior. 
One major limitation of this study is that athletes face intense pressures to manage their 
public reputations and could have hired the help of public relations consultants to craft their 
public statements. Their public statements may not necessarily accurately reflect their inner 
thoughts and beliefs. Therefore, I conducted a lab experiment to overcome the limitations 
associated with this archival study. In the lab experiment, which I will present in the next section 
as Study 2, participants faced significantly less public scrutiny than the athletes in Study 1. They 
were also assured that their responses would be anonymous, allowing them to express 
themselves more freely without the fear of being penalized. Another important goal of Study 2 
was to replicate the findings found in Study 1 with a different research methodology.  
2.3 Study 2 
 
Sample 
Two hundred and sixty students at a large Midwestern university were recruited to 
participate in this study. All participants received a show-up fee ($5) and had the opportunity to 
earn an extra $5 during the study.  
Procedure 
 I randomly assigned participants to one of five conditions: moral responsibility-positive 
moral self, moral responsibility-negative moral self, moral disengagement-positive moral self, 
moral disengagement-negative moral self, and control.  
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I first asked participants to recall a time when they cheated.
5
 Then, I asked them to write 
about their thoughts about their actions, thereby manipulating act-centered judgments (i.e., moral 
responsibility, moral disengagement), as well as their thoughts about themselves, thereby 
manipulating person-centered judgments (i.e., positive moral self, negative moral self).  
Act-centered judgments manipulation. In the moral responsibility conditions, 
participants were first asked to “Please think of a recent time when you cheated to get ahead, and 
you took personal responsibility for your actions that were against your principles and/or were 
harmful to others.” In the moral disengagement conditions, participants were asked to “Please 
think of a recent time when you cheated to get ahead, and you felt that your behavior was 
justified or not that harmful to others, and/or that responsibility for your behavior should be 
shifted to other parties or circumstances.” After these prompts, participants were asked to spend 
some time writing about what happened. 
Person-centered judgments manipulation. Next, in the positive moral self conditions, 
participants were asked to “Now, please spend some time writing down reasons for why the 
behavior you recalled does not reflect your true moral character, and why you still feel like you 
are a good person.” In the negative moral self conditions, participants were asked to “Now, 
please spend some time writing down reasons for why the behavior you recalled reflects poorly 
on your moral character, and why you feel like you are a bad person.”  
Control condition. In the control condition, participants were asked to write about the 
incident, but were not given any prompts to make act-centered or person-centered judgments. 
They were simply asked to “Please think of a recent time when you cheated to get ahead.” Then, 
                                                             
5 This approach of getting participants to recall a previous behavior and then observing their subsequent behavior in 
the lab has been widely used by several published psychological studies investigating the phenomenon of moral 
licensing, whereby participants that recalled their previous moral behavior felt licensed to engage in subsequent 
immoral behavior in the lab (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Schnall & Roper, 2012). 
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they were asked to “Please spend some time writing about what happened. How did you cheat to 
get ahead?” They were not given any additional prompts to manipulate their act-centered or 
person-centered judgments. 
Dependent variable: Likelihood of recidivism. Finally, they engaged in a paper and 
pencil problem-solving task that gave them an opportunity to cheat. All participants were led to 
believe that this was a separate study. Once participants were done with the computer-based 
portion of the study, a lab assistant handed out two sheets of paper. The first sheet was a 
worksheet with 20 matrices, each containing 12 three-digit numbers. Participants were told that 
they would be given four minutes to find two numbers per matrix that add up to 10. For each 
matrix solved, participants were told that they would receive $0.25. The second sheet was a score 
sheet where participants were told to report how many matrices they correctly solved. This sheet 
also contained an example of a correctly solved matrix for participants to refer to. This 
experimental paradigm has been used in prior research (e.g., Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008) to 
induce participants to cheat by over-reporting their score. After the four minutes have passed, 
participants were instructed to walk to a recycling box located in the corner of the room to 
deposit the first sheet (worksheet), and then to submit the second sheet with their self-reported 
score to the experimenter. This paradigm contains a direct measure of participants’ cheating. It is 
possible to calculate the extent to which each unique participant cheats by comparing the score 
they report on the score sheet with their actual worksheet. The dependent variable was calculated 
as a percentage likelihood of recidivism (i.e., number of matrices over-reported / number of 
unsolved matrices). 
I excluded data from 14 students who indicated that they were familiar with the problem-
solving matrix task as an experimental paradigm, as this would undermine the deception used in 
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this study (i.e., they would be aware that the experimenters could track whether or not they over-
reported their score). Also, the final section of the experiment involved participants in the same 
lab session completing the problem-solving matrix task at the same time, guided by verbal 
instructions from the experimenter. Thus, some participants who completed the previous writing 
section of the study quickly had to wait a significant amount of time for other participants to 
complete their writing. Thus, I also excluded data from 23 students who waited for more than 15 
minutes between sections. This resulted in a final sample of 223 students who were 20.35 years 
old on average (SD = 3.14), and 59.5% female. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. I included several items as manipulation check items. Results 
suggest that the manipulations were successful. Participants in the moral responsibility 
conditions (M = 4.34, SD = 1.30) were significantly more likely than those in the moral 
disengagement conditions (M = 3.51, SD = 1.46) to report that they wrote about how their 
actions were (1) unjustifiable, (2) harmful to others, and (3) morally blameworthy (α = .70), 
F(1,180) = 16.31, p = .00. Participants in the positive moral self conditions (M = 4.49, SD = 
1.43) were significantly more likely than those in the negative moral self conditions (M = 3.00, 
SD = 1.44) to report that they wrote about how they (1) feel like a good person, (2) have positive 
moral qualities and (3) have good moral self (α = .92), F(1, 177) = 48.50, p =.00. All these items 
were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = to a small extent; 7 = to a large extent). 
Planned comparisons across five conditions. I first conducted planned comparison tests 
to compare the control condition to all other conditions (see Figure 2.2). Across all conditions, 
the average likelihood of recidivism was 5.85% (SD = .19). Participants in the moral 
disengagement-negative moral self condition (M = .14, SD = .35) had a higher likelihood of 
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recidivism than those in the control condition (M = .06, SD = .17), b = .08, SE = .04, t = 1.99, p = 
.048. However, those in the control condition did not significantly differ from those in the moral 
responsibility-positive moral self condition (M = .04, SD = .10; b = .02, SE = .04, t = .46, p = 
.64), those in the moral responsibility-negative moral self condition (M = .03, SD = .09; b = .03, 
SE = .04, t = .65, p = .51), and those in the moral disengagement-positive moral self condition 
(M = .01, SD = .04; b = .05, SE = .04, t = 1.20, p = .23).  
 
Figure 2.2: Differences Across Five Conditions in Study 2 in Likelihood of Recidivism. 
 
2 × 2 ANOVA analyses. Next, I conducted a 2 (act-centered judgments: moral 
responsibility, moral disengagement) × 2 (person-centered judgments: positive moral self, 
negative moral self) ANOVA with likelihood of recidivism as the dependent variable. There was 
no main effect of act-centered judgments, F(1,178) = 1.82, p = .18, η2p = .01. Those in the moral 
responsibility conditions (M = .04, SD = .09) and those in the moral disengagement conditions 
(M = .08, SD = .26) did not differ in their likelihood of recidivism. However, there was a 
significant main effect of person-centered judgments, F(1,178) = 4.58, p = .03, η2p = .03, such 
that those in the negative moral self conditions (M = .09, SD = .26) had a higher likelihood of 
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recidivism than those in the positive moral self conditions (M = .03, SD = .08). These results 
show support for Hypothesis 2 about the main effect of person-centered judgments but no 
support for Hypothesis 1 about the main effect of act-centered judgments. 
The ANOVA analyses also revealed a significant interaction between act-centered and 
person-centered judgments, F(1,178) = 5.90, p = .02, η2p = .03. Act-centered judgments 
moderated the main effect of person-centered judgments on likelihood of recidivism, but results 
were different than what was predicted in Hypothesis 3. There was a significant difference 
between those in the moral disengagement-positive moral self condition and the moral 
disengagement-negative moral self condition, F(1,178) = 10.34, p = .00, η2p = .06. However, the 
difference between those in the moral responsibility-positive moral self condition and the moral 
responsibility-negative moral self condition was not significant, F(1,178) = .04, p = .84, η2p = 
.00. In other words, the main effect of person-centered judgments on likelihood of recidivism 
was strengthened when participants morally disengaged from their actions, rather than when they 
took moral responsibility for their actions. In sum, although there was a significant interaction 
between act-centered and person-centered judgments, the pattern of these interactions was 
different than what was predicted in Hypothesis 3. 
Supplementary Analyses 
After recalling the cheating incident, participants were also asked to indicate the extent to 
which they accept accountability or blame for their behavior. A three-item blame measure (α = 
.87; Bauman, Tost, & Ong, 2016) was used: (1) What I did is completely my fault, (2) I am 
solely to blame for my behavior, and (3) I am fully responsible for my actions (1 = strongly 
disagree; 7 = strongly agree). They were also asked to rate themselves on their moral self-
efficacy. A three-item moral self-efficacy measure (α = .85) was created based on an established 
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generalized self-efficacy measure (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001) and insights from theoretical 
work on moral self-efficacy (Hannah & Avolio, 2010; Hannah, Avolio, & May, 2011). 
Participants first read the question stem, “Given the behavior I recalled, I believe that…”, 
followed by three items: (1) In the future, I will be able to reach most of the moral standards I 
have set for myself, (2) In the future, when facing difficult situations, I am certain that I will do 
the ethical thing, and (3) In the future, compared to other people, I can act in an ethical manner in 
most situations (1 = not at all confident; 7 = totally confident). I also asked participants about 
their state negative affect using four negatively-valenced items (α = .89) from the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988): (1) sad, (2) distressed, 
(3) ashamed and (4) guilty (1 = very slightly or not at all; 5 = extremely). 
Blame. There was a significant main effect of act-centered judgment on blame, F(1,173) 
= 17.79, p = .00, η2p = .09, such that those in the moral responsibility conditions (M = 6.09, SD = 
.99) were more likely to accept blame for their actions than those in the moral disengagement 
conditions (M = 5.34, SD = 1.38). There was also a significant main effect of person-centered 
judgment on blame, F(1,173) = 4.31, p = .04, η2p = .02, such that those in the negative moral self 
conditions (M = 5.89, SD = 1.12) were more likely to accept blame for their actions than those in 
the positive moral self conditions (M = 5.54, SD = 1.36). The interaction between act-centered 
and person-centered judgments was not significant for blame, F(1,173) = .79, p = .38, η2p = .01.  
Moral self-efficacy. There was a significant main effect of act-centered judgment on 
moral self-efficacy, F(1,171) = 10.68, p = .00, η2p = .06, such that those in the moral 
responsibility conditions (M = 5.57, SD = 1.00) reported a higher level of moral self-efficacy 
than those in the moral disengagement conditions (M = 5.09, SD = .88). The main effect of 
person-centered judgment on moral self-efficacy was not significant, F(1,171) = 2.13, p = .15, 
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η2p = .01. The interaction between act-centered and person-centered judgments was not 
significant for moral self-efficacy, F(1,171) = .1.48, p = .23, η2p = .01. 
Negative affect. The main effect of act-centered judgment on negative affect was not 
significant, F(1,167) = .31, p = .58, η2p = .00. There was a significant main effect of person-
centered judgment on negative affect, F(1,167) = 6.12, p = .01, η2p = .04, such that those in the 
negative moral self conditions (M = 2.41, SD = 1.05) reported more negative affect than those in 
the positive moral self (M = 2.04, SD = .91).The interaction effect between act-centered and 
person-centered judgments was marginally significant for negative affect, F(1,167) = .3.25, p = 
.07, η2p = .02. However, the interaction pattern looked different from that with likelihood of 
recidivism as the dependent variable. There was a significant difference in negative affect 
between those in the moral responsibility-positive moral self condition (M = 1.96, SD = .87) and 
the moral responsibility-negative moral self condition (M = 2.60, SD = 1.10), F(1,167) = 9.31, p 
= .00, η2p = .05. However, the difference between those in the moral disengagement-positive 
moral self condition (M = 2.14, SD = .96) and the moral disengagement-negative moral self 
condition (M = 2.24, SD = .98) was not significant, F(1,167) = .22, p = .64, η2p = .00. 
Discussion 
Overall, the results suggest that participants’ person-centered judgments influenced their 
likelihood of recidivism, supporting Hypothesis 2. However, their act-centered judgments did not 
have a main effect on their likelihood of recidivism as predicted in Hypothesis 1. Therefore, 
Study 2 replicated the main effect findings in Study 1. Across both studies, there was consistent 
support for the main effect of person-centered judgments, and consistent lack of support for the 
main effect of act-centered judgments on likelihood of recidivism. Again, this is theoretically 
consistent with some researchers’ arguments about the primacy of person-centered judgments as 
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compared to act-centered judgments (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012). Furthermore, research on 
identity and the self (Leary & Tangney, 2011) argues that individuals’ self-concepts are central 
to motivating their behavior. In this study, their moral self-evaluations in response to a past 
transgression appear to have an influential role in driving their likelihood of repeating that 
transgression. 
In Study 2, there was a significant interaction effect between act-centered and person-
centered judgments. However, a closer examination of the interaction patterns suggests that they 
were different than what was predicted in Hypothesis 3. Act-centered judgments did moderate 
the link between person-centered judgments and likelihood of recidivism. However, it was moral 
disengagement that strengthened the relationship between person-centered judgment and 
likelihood of recidivism, rather than moral responsibility as predicted. Unlike the “virtuous 
synergy” described in the discussion of Study 1, the results for Study 2 suggest that there may be 
a “negative spiral” that emerges when individuals morally disengage from their actions and they 
evaluate themselves negatively (double negative). When individuals morally disengage from 
their actions, their negative moral self-evaluations become particularly influential in driving their 
future moral behavior.  
2.4 General Discussion 
In conclusion, across the two studies presented in this chapter, there was consistent 
support for the main effect of person-centered judgments and consistent lack of support for the 
main effect of act-centered judgments. While classic motivational theories suggest that both 
valence (act-centered) and expectancy (person-centered) are important factors driving 
motivation, it appears that at least in the two studies presented in this chapter, expectancy had a 
more influential role in driving likelihood of recidivism than valence. These findings highlight 
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the value and importance of considering a person-centered approach to understanding unethical 
behavior. It appears that act-centered judgments alone are insufficient for explaining 
transgressors’ likelihood of recidivism. 
Table 2.2: Summary of Hypotheses and Findings in Study 1 and Study 2. 
Hypotheses Study 1 Study 2 
 
H1 Main effect of act-centered judgments Not Supported Not Supported 
H2 Main effect of person-centered judgments Supported Supported 
H3 Act-centered judgments moderate the 
main effect of person-centered judgments 
Supported Not Supported 
 
 
Theoretically, the lack of support for the main effect of act-centered judgments could be 
explained by the dominance of person-centered judgments over act-centered judgments (Pizarro 
& Tannenbaum, 2012). Individuals’ moral self-concepts are central to their self-identities (Blasi, 
1983). People care about being a moral person and behaving ethically (Aquino & Reed, 2002). 
Most perceive themselves as moral and ethical (Epley & Dunning, 2000; Paulhus & John, 1998) 
and desire to maintain a positive moral self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi et al., 2011). 
Given the importance people place on their moral self-concepts, it is perhaps not surprising that 
their moral self-evaluations play a stronger role in influencing their future behavior than their 
act-centered evaluations. Empirically, the lack of support for the main effect of act-centered 
judgments could be due limitations in my operationalization of act-centered judgments. In both 
studies, I examined transgressors’ act-centered judgments about a specific event involving a 
transgression. For instance, in Study 1, players made statements about a specific event in where 
they were suspended, and in Study 2, participants wrote about a specific event where they 
cheated. It is possible that the value that transgressors place on not repeating a transgression is 
behavior-specific (or transgression-specific) rather than event-specific. For instance, the value 
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that transgressors place on not cheating again depends on their evaluations of the behavior of 
cheating in general, rather than their evaluations of a specific cheating event (e.g., cheating on 
the SAT when they took it in 2011). For example, in Study 2, participants’ cheating on the 
problem-solving task might not only be influenced by the one time they cheated in a college 
exam, but also all of the other times they cheated in high school, middle school and elementary 
school. This possibility should be explored in future research. For example, to manipulate act-
centered judgments in a lab experiment, participants might be instructed to recall and evaluate all 
of the times they have cheated rather than to recall and evaluate just one specific cheating event. 
The moral responsibility condition would instruct them to accept moral responsibility for the 
multiple instances in their lives in which they cheated; the moral disengagement condition would 
instruct them to morally disengage from the multiple instances in their lives in which they 
cheated. Since these act-centered judgments are behavior-specific (or transgression-specific) 
rather than event-specific, I would expect to find more support for my hypothesis regarding act-
centered judgments.  
Across both studies, I found that act-centered judgments moderated the main effect of 
person-centered judgments. However, the exact pattern of these interactions varied across 
studies. In Study 1, the main effect of person-centered judgments was strengthened when 
individuals expressed moral responsibility for their actions. However, in Study 2, the main effect 
of person-centered judgments was strengthened when individuals morally disengaged from their 
actions. Shah and Higgins’ (1997) paper provides valuable insights that might explain the 
difference in interaction patterns between Study 1 and Study 2. In their paper, they propose and 
find that the interaction of expectancy and valence shows opposite effects depending on the 
regulatory focus of the end goal. Regulatory focus theory proposes that those who are 
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promotion-focused are concerned with achieving a desirable goal, while those who are 
prevention-focused are concerned with avoiding an undesirable goal (Higgins, 1997). In the 
moral domain, those who are promotion-focused might be concerned with being ethical, while 
those who are prevention-focused might be concerned with avoiding unethical behavior (Gino & 
Margolis, 2011). The theorizing in my hypotheses assumed that transgressors would hold a 
promotion-focus towards being ethical. However, it is possible the players in Study 1 and 
participants in Study 2 differed in their regulatory focus. Perhaps the players in Study 1 were 
more focused on becoming a “clean” player (promotion-focused), while participants in Study 2 
were more focused on avoiding being a cheater (prevention-focused). In the sports context in 
Study 1, players may receive public recognition for being a clean player, leading them to hold a 
promotion-focus. However, in the lab setting in Study 2, participants did not expect to receive 
any recognition if they did not cheat, although they may have feared receiving punishment for 
cheating in the lab. Therefore, they may have been more likely to hold a prevention focus. Future 
research should explore how regulatory focus influences the interaction between act-centered 
and person-centered judgments. For example, it will be helpful to conduct an experiment with a 
2 (act-centered judgments: moral responsibility, moral disengagement) × 2 (person-centered 
judgments: positive moral self, negative moral self) × 2 (regulatory focus: promotion, 
prevention) study design. I would expect to see results similar to Study 1 for participants induced 
to have a promotion-focus, and results similar to Study 2 for participants induced to have a 
prevention-focus. 
Across both studies, I focused primarily on what happens after transgressors take moral 
responsibility for their actions or morally disengage from their actions, as well as after they 
evaluate themselves positively or negatively. However, there are likely many potential 
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moderators that determine which transgressors are more likely to take moral responsibility or 
morally disengage, as well as which transgressors are more likely to make positive moral self-
evaluations or negative moral self-evaluations. For instance, transgressors who have a higher 
level of moral awareness (Reynolds, 2006) or moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) may be 
more likely to take moral responsibility for their actions rather than morally disengage from their 
actions. Also, transgressors who find themselves in contexts that strongly value ethical behavior 
(Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe, & Umphress, 2003) or around people with strong ethical principles 
(Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005) may be more likely to take moral responsibility for their 
actions. In terms of moral self-evaluations, transgressors who are more prone to shame 
(Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992) or those who believe that individual characteristics are 
fixed (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997) may be more likely to make negative moral self-evaluations. 
In contrast, when transgressors have strong social support and encouragement from those around 
them, they may be more likely to make positive moral self-evaluations despite their wrongdoing. 
In conclusion, using two different research methodologies (i.e., an archival study and a 
lab experiment), I found consistent support for a significant main effect of person-centered 
judgments on likelihood of recidivism. Moving forward, more studies should be conducted to 
better understand when act-centered judgments might influence the likelihood of recidivism, as 
well as how act-centered and person-centered judgments interact to influence the likelihood of 
recidivism. 
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Chapter 3:  
Reflection and Beliefs about Moral Character in the Aftermath of Wrongdoing 
 
3.1 Theoretical Development 
The previous chapter put forth the idea that after wrongdoing has been committed, 
wrongdoers evaluate their actions to make inferences about their moral selves. Whereas the 
previous chapter examines how wrongdoers make post-hoc judgments about their moral selves 
by observing their own actions, this chapter examines wrongdoers’ a priori assumptions about 
the malleability of their moral selves. Specifically, this chapter considers how wrongdoers’ 
implicit theories about moral character affect their motivation to change in the aftermath of 
wrongdoing. I describe how the transformational potential of wrongdoing is only unleashed 
when wrongdoers believe that they can change.  
Research on implicit person theories suggests that people differ in the unconscious lay 
theories they hold regarding the malleability of personal attributes (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; 
Dweck, 1996; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995), such as intelligence, ability, and moral character. 
“Entity theorists” is the term used to describe those who believe that people’s personal attributes 
are fixed. Therefore, they believe that no amount of learning or effort can change or improve a 
person’s basic traits. Those with entity theories about traits tend to avoid challenging situations, 
fail to take actions to improve their ability and persist less in difficult situations or failure 
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(Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Heine et al., 2001; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999; Mueller & 
Dweck, 1998). In contrast, “incremental theorists” is used to describe those who believe that 
personal attributes can be developed. They believe that people can learn new things and that their 
personal attributes are cultivatable. Those with incremental theories about traits tend to confront 
anxiety-provoking situations and perceive these challenges as opportunity to improve; they 
engage in actions to develop their abilities and expend effort to improve (Carr, Dweck, & 
Pauker, 2012; Heine et al., 2001; Hong et al., 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998).  
Most of the present empirical research on implicit person theories focuses on people’s 
beliefs about intelligence, and has mostly been conducted within the academic context 
(Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Henderson & Dweck, 1990; Hong et al., 1999; 
Mangels, Butterfield, Lamb, Good, & Dweck, 2006; Rattan, Good, & Dweck, 2012). More 
recently, researchers have brought ideas about implicit person theories into the organizational 
literature to explain employees’ work ability, work performance and leadership (Heslin, Latham, 
Vandewalle, 2005; Heslin & Vandewalle, 2011; Heslin, Vandewalle, & Latham, 2006; Hoyt, 
Burnette, & Innella, 2012). For example, they have found that managers’ implicit theories about 
the malleability of personal attributes affect how they coach employees (Heslin et al., 2006), how 
they appraise employees’ performance (Heslin et al., 2005), and employees’ perceptions of those 
performance appraisals (Heslin & Vandewalle, 2011).  
In this chapter, I extend the current scope of research on implicit person theories by 
applying it to the moral domain and the non-academic context. To date, only one published paper 
has attempted to do this. Schumann and Dweck’s (2014) paper found that individuals who see 
personality as malleable are more willing to accept blame for their transgressions. The research 
presented in this dissertation chapter builds on this initial work in several significant ways. First, 
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their paper examined the influence of beliefs about the malleability of personality rather than the 
malleability of moral character specifically. Early work on implicit person theories suggests that 
implicit theories are domain-specific (Chiu et al., 1997). For example, someone might believe 
that intelligence is fixed but that moral character can be developed, and vice versa. Given the 
domain-specificity of implicit theories, it is important to recognize and understand the specific 
role of implicit theories about moral character. Second, their paper examined admitting 
responsibility as the dependent variable, but not how individuals are motivated to change in the 
aftermath of their wrongdoing. While admitting responsibility is concerned with past behavior, 
individuals’ motivation to change likely has more direct implications for their future behavior. 
Finally, their paper primarily used vignette studies (e.g., participants imagined committing a 
hypothetical transgression). However, it is likely that more practical insights can be derived from 
examining participants’ responses to actual transgressions that they committed, and to link these 
responses to their actual motivational and behavioral outcomes. In this chapter, I plan to 
investigate how individuals’ implicit person theories about moral character impact their 
motivation to change in the aftermath of their actual transgressions. 
Research on implicit person theories in the non-moral domain has consistently found that 
those who believe that intelligence can be developed are more likely to adopt learning goals 
(Blackwell et al., 2007; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Hong et al., 1999; Mangels et al., 2006; Meece, 
Blumenfeld, & Hoyle, 1988; Miller, Greene, Montalvo, Ravindran, & Nichols, 1996; Robins & 
Pals, 2010). In the aftermath of task-oriented or academic failures, they are more likely to be 
motivated to improve and develop their technical skills or knowledge. Building on this work that 
has largely been situated in the academic context, I argue that transgressors who believe that 
moral character can be developed are more motivated to improve their moral behavior in the 
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aftermath of wrongdoing. In other words, they display more motivation to change compared to 
transgressors who believe that moral character is fixed.  
Hypothesis 1: In the aftermath of wrongdoing, individuals who believe that moral 
character can be developed are more likely to be motivated to change than individuals who 
believe that moral character is fixed. 
Prior research has also shown that those who believe that intelligence can be developed 
are more motivated to learn because they find negative goal feedback less threatening and are 
therefore more willing to expend cognitive effort confronting that negative goal feedback (e.g., 
Dupeyrat & Mariné, 2005; Mangels et al., 2006; Meece et al., 1988; Miller et al., 1996; Nolen, 
1988). Their deep cognitive engagement with negative goal feedback heightens their 
commitment to learning goals. In contrast, those who believe that intelligence is fixed find 
negative goal feedback anxiety provoking, so they are more likely to avoid such cognitive 
engagement. Deep cognitive processing is associated with greater effort expenditure, persistence 
and the use of learning strategies such as elaboration or organization, while shallow cognitive 
processing is associated with the avoidance of such effort, persistence and strategies (Dupeyrat & 
Mariné, 2005; Miller et al., 1996). 
Similarly, in the moral domain, it is likely that those who believe that moral character can 
be developed are more motivated to change in the aftermath of wrongdoing because they find 
that negative feedback less threatening and are more likely to spend time and effort 
contemplating on what went wrong, and what they might do to improve in the future. In contrast, 
those who believe that moral character is fixed will only engage in shallow cognitive processing 
since the negative feedback is threatening to them. These arguments suggest that deep cognitive 
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engagement with negative feedback occurs more automatically in those who believe that moral 
character can be developed. 
Nevertheless, cognitive engagement in the aftermath of negative events has been 
conceptualized as both an automatic and a deliberate process (Park, 2010). In other words, 
although people have varying natural propensities to cognitively engage with negative feedback, 
this cognitive engagement can also be deliberately structurally enabled. In the organizational 
behavior literature, there is a growing literature on reflection with similar arguments. Although 
individuals might have varying natural propensities to reflect on their work (e.g., Ong, Ashford, 
& Bindl, 2016), reflection on work events can also be enabled through structured interventions 
(e.g., DeRue, Nahrgang, Hollenbeck, & Workman, 2012). Although these interventions typically 
involve cognitive engagement with task-related feedback, I argue that they might have helpful 
benefits in the moral domain. Indeed, multiple studies have found that reflection and cognitive 
engagement improve moral outcomes (Derfler-Rozin, Moore, & Staats, in press; Gunia, Wang, 
Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 2012; Moore & Tenbrunsel, 2014; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 
2012). For example, Gunia and colleague (2012) found that compared to making an immediate 
moral decision, contemplating the moral decision results in more ethical decision-making in a 
lab-based role play scenario. Shalvi and colleagues (2012) instructed participants to privately roll 
a die and report the outcome. Participants who were given more time to report their outcome 
were less likely to be dishonest. Whereas these studies are largely focused on contemplation on 
hypothetical moral decisions or moral dilemmas in an experimental lab setting, I argue that 
reflection on one’s own lived experiences also has positive implications for one’s subsequent 
moral behavior. Furthermore, these studies emphasize reflection on a future moral decision or 
moral behavior before making that decision or performing the behavior. I argue that reflection on 
  53 
one’s past moral decisions or moral behavior will also have implications for one’s future moral 
decisions or moral behavior. 
In the aftermath of wrongdoing, the guidance of structured reflection interventions may 
be particularly useful for those who do not naturally cognitively engage with negative feedback, 
which is necessary for driving motivation to change. When individuals who believe that moral 
character is fixed are deliberately prompted to reflect on their wrongdoing, their motivation to 
change may match up to those who believe that moral character can be developed. Therefore, I 
propose that structured reflection moderates the relationship between implicit person theories 
about moral character and motivation to change, such that when those who believe that moral 
character is fixed are engage in structured reflection, they are just as likely to be motivated to 
change as those who believe that moral character can be developed.  
Hypothesis 2: Structured reflection moderates the relationship between implicit person 
theories about moral character and motivation to change. Specifically, without structured 
reflection, those who believe that moral character is fixed are less likely to be motivated to 
change than those who believe that moral character can be developed. However, when those 
who believe that moral character is fixed engage in structured reflection, they are just as likely 
to be motivated to change as those who believe that moral character can be developed. 
Educational psychology researchers have found that students with a higher motivation to 
learn display higher levels of achievement (Blackwell et al., 2007; Meece & Holt, 1993; Miller et 
al., 1996; Greene & Miller, 1996; Phillips & Gully, 1997; Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; Pintrich & 
Garcia, 1991). In work settings as well, employees with a higher motivation to learn show higher 
levels of work performance (Brett & VandeWalle, 1999; Sujan, Weitz, & Kumar, 1994; 
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VandeWalle, Brown, Cron, & Slocum, 1999; VandeWalle, Cron, & Slocum, 2001). These 
findings are consistent with earlier theoretical work on implicit person theories about intelligence 
(Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). These studies have primarily explained the link 
between motivation and performance from a self-regulation perspective. For example, 
VandeWalle and colleagues (2001) argue that when individuals are motivated to learn, they feel 
a higher level of self-efficacy for performing well, they exert a higher level of effort to perform 
well, and they display a higher level of goal setting. Extrapolating to the moral domain, I propose 
that when transgressors are motivated to change, they similarly feel a higher level of self-
efficacy for changing their moral behavior, they exert a higher level of effort to change their 
moral behavior, and they also display a higher level of goal setting with respect to their future 
moral behavior. Thus, in the aftermath of wrongdoing, individuals with a higher motivation to 
change are more likely to have a lower likelihood of recidivism. 
Hypothesis 3: In the aftermath of wrongdoing, motivation to change leads to a lower 
likelihood of recidivism. 
3.2 Study 1 
 Study 1 is a survey study that aims to test Hypothesis 1.  
Sample 
Participants (N = 101, 37.6% female) were working adults recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). On average, the participants were 34.09 years of age (SD = 10.34). 
All participants reported that they were currently employed. The majority of them (83.2%) were 
currently working full-time, while 16.8% were currently working part-time. They reported 
having an average of 14.02 years (SD = 9.82) of work experience. An attention check question 
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was embedded in the middle of the survey to ensure that participants were paying attention to all 
the instructions and questions in the survey. All participants passed the attention check.  
Procedure  
 Implicit person theory about moral character. Participants were first asked to report 
the extent to which they agreed with the following three statements measuring their implicit 
theory of character (α = .94; Chiu et al., 1997): (1) “A person's moral character is something very 
basic about them and it can't be changed much,” (2) “Whether a person is responsible and sincere 
or not is deeply ingrained in their personality. It cannot be changed very much,” (3) “There is not 
much that can be done to change a person's moral traits (e.g., conscientiousness, uprightness, and 
honesty).” Participants responded on a seven point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). Those who receive a high score on this measure are more likely to agree that 
moral character is fixed, while those who receive a low score on this measure are more likely to 
agree with that moral character can be developed.  
 Recall task. Next, participants were asked to recall a personal experience and write about 
it. They were instructed that the writing exercise would be the most beneficial for them if they 
took the exercise seriously and reported their experience as honestly as possible. They were also 
assured that their responses would be kept completely confidential.  
Participants were told to think of a time when they did something at work that they felt 
was wrong or unethical, and as a result experienced guilt, remorse, and regret. Some examples of 
unethical work behaviors were given to them, such as reporting inaccurate information on 
business or financial documents, using company time or services to conduct personal activities, 
falsifying their expense report, lying to a coworker, or doing something else that was harmful or 
potentially harmful to themselves, other coworkers, or their organization. Participants were asked 
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to take their time to ponder on the event and write about it in the textbox provided. They were 
also reminded that if multiple events come to mind, they should choose just one event. 
Participants spent an average of 274s (4m 34s) writing about the event. Additional analyses show 
that participants’ implicit person theory did not significantly influence how long they spent on 
this task (B = .56, SE = 11.13, t = .05, p = .96), or how many words they typed in this task (B = 
.13.39, SE = 20.27, t = .66, p = .51). 
Motivation to change. After the recall task, participants answered questions about their 
motivation to change. Woodyatt and Wenzel’s (2013) self-forgiveness scale (α = .86) was used 
to measure this. Examples of items used include: “I am trying to learn from my wrongdoing,” 
and “Since committing the offense I have tried to change.” Participants responded on a seven 
point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Results 
Implicit person theory (M = 3.89, SD = 1.67) and motivation to change (M = 4.93, SD = 
1.14) were significantly correlated (r = -.22, p = .03). Further regression analyses indicated that 
there was a statistically significant main effect of implicit person theory on motivation to change 
such that those who believe that moral character is fixed were less likely to be motivated to 
change than those who believe that moral character can be developed, b = -.15, SE = .07, t = -
2.24, p = .03. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported. 
Discussion 
 Results from Study 1 show initial support for Hypothesis 1 that individuals’ implicit 
beliefs about the malleability of moral character influence their motivation to change in the 
aftermath of wrongdoing. However, one major limitation of this study is that it only suggests a 
correlational relationship between implicit theories about moral character and motivation to 
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change. Therefore, I conducted Study 2 to experimentally manipulate people’s implicit theories 
about moral character and test if they have a causal influence on motivation to change in the 
aftermath of wrongdoing. 
3.3 Study 2 
 Study 2 is an experiment that tests Hypothesis 1. This study aims to replicate the results 
in Study 1 and to establish a causal relationship between people’s implicit theories about moral 
character and their motivation to change in the aftermath of wrongdoing.  
Sample 
Participants (N = 96, 45.9% female) in this study were working adults recruited from 
MTurk. Individuals who had participated in Study 1 were not allowed to participate in this study. 
On average, the participants were 34.01 years of age (SD = 11.60). All participants reported that 
they were currently employed. Majority of them (83.7%) were currently working full-time, while 
16.3% were currently working part-time. They reported having an average of 13.57 years (SD = 
10.66) of work experience. An attention check question was embedded in the middle of the 
survey to ensure that participants were paying attention to all the instructions and questions in 
the survey. All participants passed the attention check.  
Procedure 
 At the beginning of the study session, participants were told that they would be 
participating in two studies. The first study would involve reading an article and assessing its 
appropriateness for high school students. The second study would involve a recall task. 
Implicit person theory about moral character manipulation. Participants first read an 
article that was ostensibly being pilot tested for a future study to be conducted on high school 
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students. This paradigm has been used in prior research to manipulate participants’ implicit 
theories (e.g., Chiu et al., 1997; Rattan & Dweck, 2010; Schumann & Dweck, 2014). I adapted 
the articles used in previous studies for this study; for instance, phrases like “personality” and 
“personal traits” were replaced with phrases like “moral character” and “moral traits.” 
Participants either read an article that presented arguments that moral character is fixed (fixed 
mindset condition) or that moral character can be developed (growth mindset condition). For 
example, the article in the fixed mindset condition contained quotes such as: “Moral character 
seems to be rather fixed and to develop consistently along the same path over time. Character 
traits might start as a bundle of possibilities, but in the early years, the possibilities appear to 
solidify into a cohesive personality profile.” The article in the growth mindset condition 
contained quotes such as: “Moral character is changeable and can be influenced over time. In 
fact, moral traits are basically a bundle of possibilities that wait to be developed and cultivated.” 
The overall structure of these articles mirrored the structure of the articles used in previous 
paradigms manipulating implicit theories about personality in general.  
After reading their randomly assigned article, to uphold the cover story, participants 
answered questions about whether the article was appropriate for high school students’ reading 
level. An online timer was included in the study to time how long participants spent reading the 
article and answering questions about the article. The timers were set so that all participants were 
required to spend at least 90s reading the article. Three participants were dropped from the study 
at this point as they spent more than 20 minutes reading the article and answering questions, 
suggesting that they might not have been paying full attention to the manipulation materials (e.g., 
switching windows to look at other online materials).  
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Recall task and motivation to change. Participants then moved on to the “next” study in 
which they would recall a personal experience. Participants were given the same instructions as 
in Study 1. Participants also responded to the same measure (α = .87) as in Study 1. 
Manipulation Check 
 As a manipulation check, participants were asked to respond to three items about their 
implicit person theory (α = .92) after the manipulation. The same items used in Study 1 were 
used here. Participants in the fixed mindset condition (M = 3.56, SD = 1.36) had significantly 
different responses from those in the malleable mindset condition (M = 2.53, SD = 1.38), F(1, 
92) = 13.07, p < .001, d = .75, suggesting that the manipulation was successful. Additional 
analyses revealed that participants in the two conditions did not differ in terms of the time they 
spent on the recall task, F(1, 92) = .00, p =.98, or the number of words they wrote during the 
recall task, F(1, 92), = .13, p = .72.  
To check if participants in the different conditions were recalling different transgressions, 
I asked two questions: “How would you rate the extent to which your actions were severe 
(morally wrong and harmful)?” (1 = not severe at all, 7 = extremely severe) and “How long ago 
did the event you recalled take place?” (1 = less than a week ago, 7 = more than 2 years ago). 
The transgressions recalled by participants in the two conditions were equally severe, F(1, 92) = 
1.02, p = .32, and occurred an equally long time ago, F(1, 92) = 1.06, p = .31. 
Results 
 A one-way ANOVA analysis revealed that participants in the fixed mindset condition (M 
= 4.56, SD = 1.05) reported lower motivation to change than those in the growth mindset 
condition (M = 5.27, SD = 1.08), F(1, 92) = 10.17, p < .001, d = .67.  Thus, Hypothesis 1 was 
supported. 
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Discussion 
 In this study, participants’ implicit theories about moral character were successfully 
manipulated. Participants in the fixed mindset condition were significantly less motivated to 
change compared to participants in the growth mindset condition. Study 2 found support for a 
causal relationship between people’s implicit theories about moral character and their motivation 
to change in the aftermath of wrongdoing. The manipulations developed for Study 2 were used in 
all subsequent studies.  
3.4 Study 3 
Study 3 is an experiment that aims to replicate the main effect findings from earlier 
studies, as well as to test Hypothesis 2 regarding the moderating effect of structured reflection 
interventions. This study has a 2 (implicit person theory: fixed mindset, growth mindset) × 3 
(reflection: reflection, recounting, no reflection) between-subjects design. Among participants 
who do not engage in reflection, if those in the fixed mindset condition are less motivated to 
change than those in the growth mindset condition, then Hypothesis 1 is supported. Also, if 
structured reflection can enable those in the fixed mindset condition to be just as likely as those 
in the growth mindset condition to be motivated to change, then Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
Sample 
Participants (N = 315, 45.7% female) were adults recruited from MTurk for a 20-minute 
study. Again, participants who participated in the earlier studies were not allowed to participate 
in this study. On average, the participants in this study were 33.48 years of age (SD = 10.09). 
Majority (80.4%) of the remaining participants were currently working full-time, while 19.6% 
were currently working part-time. They reported having an average of 13.16 years (SD = 9.08) of 
work experience. An attention check question was embedded in the middle of the survey to 
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ensure that participants were paying attention to all the instructions and questions in the survey. 
Four participants who failed the attention check were dropped from the study, leaving a final 
sample of 311 participants. 
Procedure 
Implicit person theory about moral character manipulation. This study used the same 
manipulation for implicit person theory as in Study 2. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
fixed mindset or the growth mindset condition. Using the same criteria as in Study 2, five 
participants were dropped from the study at this point due to inattention. 
Reflection manipulation. Participants then moved on to the “next” study in which they 
would recall a personal experience. With the same instructions as in Studies 1 and 2, participants 
were asked to recall a time when they did something unethical at work. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In the reflection condition, participants were given 
prompts to induce a deeper level of cognitive engagement. They were asked to think about 
questions like “Why did you do what you did?,” “How are you learning from your wrongdoing?” 
and “How might you try to change?” In the recounting condition, participants were given 
prompts to induce a shallower level of cognitive engagement. They were asked to think about 
questions like “How long ago did the event happen?,” “Who else was involved in the event?” 
and “Where did the event occur?” In the no reflection condition, participants were instructed to 
recall an event and were not given time to reflect on it.  
Motivation to change. After writing down their reflections or recalling the event, 
participants responded to the same measure of motivation to change (α = .89) as in Study 2.  
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Manipulation Check 
 Participants responded to three items about their implicit person theory (α = .92) after the 
first manipulation. Participants in the fixed mindset condition (M = 3.60, SD = 1.61) had 
significantly different responses from those in the malleable mindset condition (M = 2.51, SD = 
1.22), F(1, 305) = 45.28, p < .001, d = .77, suggesting that the manipulation was successful. 
Results 
The results of the 2 × 3 study design are displayed in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1: Interaction of Implicit Theory and Reflection on Motivation to Change in Study 3.  
 
 
 Among participants in the no reflection conditions, those in the growth mindset condition 
(M = 5.49, SD = .96) reported greater motivation to change than those in the fixed mindset 
condition (M = 4.85, SD = 1.28), F(1, 300) = 10.40, p = .00, η2p = .03. Among participants in the 
recounting conditions, those in the growth mindset condition (M = 5.40, SD = .77) also reported 
greater motivation to change than those in the fixed mindset condition (M = 5.05, SD = 1.06), but 
this difference was marginally significant, F(1, 300) = 2.84, p = .09, η2p = .01. Finally, among 
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participants in the reflection conditions, those in the growth mindset condition (M = 5.56, SD = 
1.04) and those in the fixed mindset condition (M = 5.57, SD = .99) did not differ in their 
motivation to change, F(1, 300) = .00, p = .95, η2p = .00. Further planned comparisons tests show 
that among those in the fixed mindset conditions, those in the reflection condition reported 
significantly more motivation to change than those in the no reflection condition, b = .72, SE = 
.21, t = 3.42, p = .00, and those in the recounting condition did not significantly differ from those 
in the no reflection condition, b = .21, SE = .20, t = 1.04, p = .30.  
 
In summary, these results show that in the no reflection conditions, those in the fixed 
mindset condition reported lower motivation to change compared to those in the growth mindset 
condition. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported. However, reflection enabled those with a fixed 
mindset to become just as motivated to change as those with a growth mindset. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 was also supported. Furthermore, there was a marginally significant difference in 
motivation to change between fixed mindset and growth mindset for those who were in the 
recounting conditions. This suggests that recounting resulted in more motivation to change than 
no reflection on one’s transgressions, but it was not as influential in bringing about motivation to 
change compared to reflection. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 3 show that without reflection, those with a fixed mindset are less 
likely to be motivated to change compared to those with a growth mindset. Nevertheless, 
motivation to change can be structurally induced through a reflection intervention. For the 
intervention to be effective at helping those with a fixed mindset, it has to entail more than mere 
recounting of the facts of the wrongdoing. It should involve deeper cognitive engagement with 
questions about why one acted the way one did, how one is learning from the wrongdoing, and 
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how one might try to change. Reflection enables deeper cognitive engagement, which forces 
individuals to confront with negative feedback stemming from their past transgression, even if 
that negative feedback is personally threatening. Although recounting a transgression enables 
more cognitive engagement with negative feedback compared to no reflection on the 
transgression, it is not as effective as deep reflection on the transgression.  
3.5 Study 4 
 Study 4 is a lab experiment that aims to replicate the results in Study 3, and to test 
Hypothesis 3, which proposes a negative causal link between motivation to change and 
likelihood of recidivism. In addition, instead of having a no reflection condition, this study 
involves a different control condition, which will be described below.  
This study has a 2 (implicit person theory: fixed mindset, growth mindset) × 3 (reflection: 
reflection, recounting, control) between-subjects design. Among participants in the control 
conditions, if those in the fixed mindset condition are less motivated to change than those in the 
growth mindset condition, then Hypothesis 1 is supported. Also, if structured reflection can 
enable those in the fixed mindset condition to be just as likely as those in the growth mindset 
condition to be motivated to change, then Hypothesis 2 is supported. Finally, if motivation to 
change leads to a lower likelihood of recidivism, then Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
Sample 
 Participants (N = 334, 41.0% female) were students enrolled in an undergraduate 
organizational behavior class in a Midwestern business school who participated in this study as 
part of a class requirement. All participants received research credit for their participation and 
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had the opportunity to earn an extra $5 during the study. On average, the participants in this 
study were 20.09 years of age (SD = .47).  
Procedure 
There were three parts to this study and participants were led to assume that they were 
three separate studies. First, participants were told to read and evaluate an article, which served 
as the manipulation of implicit person theory. Second, they were asked to recall a time when they 
cheated and engage in a writing task, which served as the manipulation of reflection. Following 
the reflection manipulation, participants answered several scale items. Third, participants did a 
paper and pencil problem-solving task that gave them an opportunity to cheat. An attention 
check question was embedded in the middle of the study. Twelve participants who failed the 
attention check were dropped from the study. In addition, 25 participants were excluded from 
analyses because they indicated that they were not able or did not want to recall a cheating 
incident as instructed in the reflection manipulation. Finally, since the last part of the study 
required participants in the same lab session to complete the problem-solving matrix task at the 
same time, some participants had to wait for other participants to complete the recall and writing 
task before moving on to the next task altogether. Thus, I also excluded data from 66 students 
who waited for more than 15 minutes between the tasks. This resulted in a final sample of 231 
students. 
Implicit person theory about moral character manipulation. This study used the same 
manipulation for implicit person theory as in Studies 2 and 3. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the fixed mindset or the growth mindset condition. Participants either read an article 
that presented arguments that moral character is fixed (fixed mindset condition) or that moral 
character can be developed (growth mindset condition). 
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Reflection manipulation. The instructions participants received for the reflection 
condition and the recounting condition were similar to those in Study 3. In the reflection 
condition, participants were given prompts to induce a deeper level of cognitive engagement 
(e.g., How are you learning from this?). In the recounting condition, participants were given 
prompts to induce a shallower level of cognitive engagement (e.g., How long ago did the event 
happen?). 
The only difference is that instead of getting participants to recall a time when they did 
something at work that they felt was wrong or unethical, participants were specifically instructed 
to recall a time when they “cheated to get ahead, that is, acted dishonestly or unfairly to gain an 
advantage.” This was done to more closely parallel the measure of the dependent variable in this 
study (i.e., likelihood of cheating on the problem-solving matrix task).  
In the control condition, participants were first asked to recall a time when they cheated 
to get ahead. However, unlike the participants in the no reflection condition in Study 3 who did 
not engage in any writing, participants in the control condition in this study engaged in a writing 
task. Specifically, they were instructed to write about the last time they went grocery shopping 
(Gino & Desai, 2012), instead of the time they cheated. They were given prompts such as, “How 
long ago did this happen?,” “Who else was with you?” and “Where did you go?” 
Motivation to change. After the reflection manipulation, participants responded to the 
same measure of motivation to change (α = .90) as in earlier studies. 
Dependent variable: Likelihood of recidivism. The matrix task used in Chapter 2 Study 
2 was administered to participants in this study. As before, the dependent variable was calculated 
as a percentage likelihood of recidivism (i.e., number of matrices over-reported / number of 
unsolved matrices). 
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Results 
Motivation to change. The results of the 2 × 3 study design are displayed in Figure 3.2. 
Among participants in the control conditions, those in the growth mindset condition (M = 4.25, 
SD = 1.44) and those in the fixed mindset condition (M = 4.12, SD = 1.35) did not differ in their 
motivation to change, F(1, 224) = .16, p = .69, η2p = .00. Among participants in the recounting 
conditions, those in the growth mindset condition (M = 4.47, SD = 1.23) and those in the fixed 
mindset condition (M = 4.68, SD = 1.37) did not differ in their motivation to change, F(1, 224) = 
.44, p = .51, η2p = .00. Lastly, among participants in the reflection conditions, those in the growth 
mindset condition (M = 4.66, SD = 1.41) and those in the fixed mindset condition (M = 4.57, SD 
= 1.43) also did not differ in their motivation to change, F(1, 224) = .10, p = .76, η2p = .00.  
 
Figure 3.2: Interaction of Implicit Theory and Reflection on Motivation to Change in Study 4.  
 
 
In summary, these results do not show support for Hypothesis 1 and 2. It is possible that 
compared to the no reflection condition in Study 3, the control condition in this study introduced 
other confounding mechanisms (e.g., psychological dissonance) that interfered with participants’ 
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motivation to change. Specifically, participants in the control conditions were first asked to recall 
a time they cheated, then they were asked to write about a time they went grocery shopping. This 
design was used to give an equivalent writing task to participants who were not asked to engage 
in reflection or recounting of their past experience. However, the lack of coherence between 
these two sets of instructions could have confused participants, which affected their responses to 
the implicit person theory about moral character manipulation. 
Likelihood of recidivism. To test Hypothesis 3, I used regression analyses (Table 3.1). 
Across all conditions, the average likelihood of recidivism was 7.8% (SD = .19). Motivation to 
change (M = 4.45, SD = 1.38) had a significant positive relationship with likelihood of 
recidivism (M = .08, SD = .19), after controlling for participants’ actual performance on the 
matrix task, b = -.02, SE = .01, t = -2.03, p = .04, R
2
 = .02. This supports Hypothesis 3. 
 
Table 3.1: Study 4 Regression Analyses. 
 DV = Likelihood of Recidivism 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
(Constant) .14 (.03)** .22 (.05)** 
Actual Performance -.01 (.00)* -.01 (.00)** 
Motivation to Change  -.02 (.01)* 
R
2
 .03* .04** 
ΔR2  .02* 
* p < .05, ** p <.01. 
 
However, because the manipulations did not influence motivation to change as predicted 
(i.e., no support for Hypothesis 1 and inconclusive support for Hypothesis 2), there were no 
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significant differences in likelihood of recidivism between conditions (see Figure 3.3). Among 
participants in the control conditions, those in the growth mindset condition (M = .05, SD = .17) 
and those in the fixed mindset condition (M = .07, SD = .18) did not differ in their likelihood of 
recidivism, F(1, 224) = .16, p = .69, η2p = .00. Among participants in the recounting conditions, 
those in the growth mindset condition (M = .09, SD = .17) and those in the fixed mindset 
condition (M = .08, SD = .18) did not differ in their likelihood of recidivism, F(1, 224) = .04, p = 
.85, η2p = .00. Lastly, among participants in the reflection conditions, those in the growth mindset 
condition (M = .12, SD = .28) and those in the fixed mindset condition (M = .07, SD = .18) also 
did not differ in their likelihood of recidivism, F(1, 224) = 1.25, p = .27, η2p = .01. 
 
Figure 3.3: Interaction of Implicit Theory and Reflection on Likelihood of Recidivism in Study 4. 
 
Supplementary Analyses 
After participants rated their motivation to change, they were also asked to think about 
the time they cheated and to rate their causal attributions for their cheating behavior (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Lack of effort was measured with two items: This incident 
occurred due to (1) a lack of effort on my part and (2) a lack of willpower on my part (α = .73). 
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Lack of moral character was measured with two items: This incident occurred due to (1) my poor 
moral character and (2) flaws in my moral character (α = .87). These items were developed based 
on theoretical insights from Hong et al. (1999). Participants also responded to four items from 
Skinner and Brewer’s (2002) measure of cognitive appraisal style. Challenge appraisal style was 
measured with two items: (1) I have tended to focus on the positive aspects of this incident, and 
(2) I believe that this incident contains the potential for positive benefits (α = .82). Threat 
appraisal style was measured with two items: (1) This incident makes me feel like a failure, and 
(2) This incident makes me concerned that others will not approve of me (α = .84). 
Causal attributions. There were no significant differences in lack of effort attributions 
between the growth mindset and the fixed mindset condition, for those in the control condition, 
F(1, 219) = .58, p = .45, η2p = .00, the recounting condition, F(1, 219) = 2.33, p = .13, η
2
p = .01, 
and the reflection condition, F(1, 219) = 3.52, p = .06, η2p = .02. Similarly, there were no 
significant differences in lack of moral character attributions between the growth mindset and the 
fixed mindset condition, for those in the control condition, F(1, 219) = 1.21, p = .27, η2p = .01, 
the recounting condition, F(1, 219) = 2.32, p = .13, η2p = .01, and the reflection condition, F(1, 
219) = .77, p = .38, η2p = .00. Therefore, it is unlikely that causal attributions drive any of the 
results in this study. 
Appraisal styles. As for appraisal styles, there were no significant differences in 
challenge appraisal style between the growth mindset and the fixed mindset condition, for those 
in the control condition, F(1, 218) = .46, p = .50, η2p = .00, the recounting condition, F(1, 218) = 
.01, p = .93, η2p = .00, and the reflection condition, F(1, 218) = .18, p = .67, η
2
p = .00. Similarly, 
there were no significant differences in lack of moral character attributions between the growth 
mindset and the fixed mindset condition, for those in the control condition, F(1, 218) = .28, p = 
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.60, η2p = .00, the recounting condition, F(1, 218) = 1.20, p = .28, η
2
p = .01, and the reflection 
condition, F(1, 218) = 2.11, p = .15, η2p = .01. Therefore, it is unlikely that appraisal styles drive 
any of the results in this study. 
Discussion 
 Study 4 found support for Hypothesis 3, but no support for Hypothesis 1 and 2. That is, 
although the experimental manipulations for implicit person theory and reflection failed to 
influence participants’ motivation to change, their motivation to change did have the proposed 
negative impact on their likelihood of recidivism.
6
 
 One reason the findings from Study 3 (i.e., support for Hypotheses 1 and 2) were not 
replicated could be the changes in the wording of the reflection manipulations. Studies 1 to 3 
asked participants to “think of a time when they did something at work that they felt was wrong 
or unethical, and as a result experienced guilt, remorse, and regret.” This instruction leads 
participants to think about incidents that they feel some degree of guilt and remorse about. 
However, because of the need to link the reflection manipulation to cheating on the problem-
solving matrix task, this study asked students to “think of a time when they cheated to get 
ahead.” However, participants were not instructed that the cheating should be an incident that 
they feel is “wrong or unethical,” or that they feel “guilt, remorse, and regret” about. Therefore, 
the incidents being recalled in Study 4 might be qualitatively different from the incidents being 
recalled in earlier studies. Indeed, Study 4 participants, who were university students, mostly 
recalled incidents about academic cheating, such as cheating on an exam or a homework 
assignment. However, participants in earlier studies, who were working adults, recalled a wide 
variety of workplace incidents, such as stealing, lying, or harming others. Also, it is possible that 
                                                             
6
 Supplementary analyses also suggest that the experimental manipulations for implicit person theory and reflection 
did not influence participants’ causal attributions and their appraisal styles. 
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being asked to recall an experience of cheating and then being asked to write about one’s 
experience grocery shopping introduced psychological dissonance that interfered with 
participants responses. Indeed, in an open-ended comments box displayed on their computer 
screens at the end of the entire session, several participants in the control condition mentioned 
that they thought it was odd that they were being asked to think about their experience grocery 
shopping in the middle of the lab session. 
Another limitation of this study was the data quality. In this study, it was necessary for all 
participants in the same lab session to complete the paper-and-pencil problem-solving matrix 
task at the same time since they were guided along by the experimenter’s verbal instructions. 
However, due to the wide variance in the amount of time participants took to complete the 
implicit person theory manipulation and the reflection manipulation, many participants had to 
wait 15 minutes or longer to proceed on to the problem-solving matrix task. Almost 20% of the 
data was excluded for this reason. Also, perhaps due to the fear of getting caught or punished, a 
significant number of participants (N = 25) did not write anything about their experience 
cheating. For instance, they would leave the question blank or write that they were unwilling to 
share their experience. Studies 1 to 3 involved participants being asked questions about their 
wrongdoing by someone with limited ability to communicate with them or discipline them. 
However, Study 4 involved students being asked questions about their academic cheating by an 
authority figure at their academic institution. Therefore, the incidents that the participants in 
Study 4 wrote about might be qualitatively different from the incidents that participants in earlier 
studies wrote about. 
In the next study, Study 5, I sought to design an improved version of Study 4. On top of 
the control condition used in this study, I included the no reflection condition used in Study 3. I 
  73 
also used the wording of the reflection manipulation instructions that were used in Study 3, 
instead of those in Study 4. Finally, I conducted the study online so that participants did not have 
to wait for a long period while other participants in the lab finish their parts. The online study 
allowed each participant to work through the session at his or her own pace. 
3.6 Study 5 
Study 5 is an online experiment that aims to replicate the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 
in Study 3, and to replicate the results for Hypothesis 3 in Study 4. Since Study 5 is administered 
online, long wait times between tasks are eliminated, and since participants are not students, they 
might potentially feel less fearful about writing honestly about their wrongdoing.  
This study had a 2 (implicit person theory: fixed mindset, growth mindset) × 4 
(reflection: reflection, recounting, no reflection, control) between-subjects design. Among 
participants in the no reflection conditions, if those in the fixed mindset conditions are less 
motivated to change than those in the growth mindset conditions, then Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
Among participants in the control conditions, if those in the fixed mindset condition do not differ 
from those in the growth mindset condition, then the lack of support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 in 
Study 4 are likely due to the design of the control condition. Among participants in the reflection 
conditions, if those in the fixed mindset condition are just as likely as those in the growth mindset 
condition to be motivated to change, then Hypothesis 2 is supported. Finally, if motivation to 
change leads to a lower likelihood of recidivism, then Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
Sample 
Participants (N = 411, 51.9% female) were adults recruited from MTurk for a 30-minute 
study. All participants received $1.00 for completing the study and had the opportunity to earn 
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an extra $2.00 during the study. Participants who participated in the earlier studies were not 
allowed to participate in this study. On average, the participants in this study were 35.43 years of 
age (SD = 10.99). Majority (84.7%) of the remaining participants were currently working full-
time, while the remaining 15.3% were currently working part-time or previously employed. They 
reported having an average of 15.47 years (SD = 10.69) of work experience. An attention check 
question was embedded in the middle of the survey to ensure that participants were paying 
attention to all the instructions and questions in the survey. Five participants who failed the 
attention check were dropped from the study. In addition, participants’ survey times were 
examined. Those who completed the survey in less than ten minute (i.e., suggesting they rushed 
through the study) or took more than an hour (i.e., suggesting they were not completely focused 
on the study or did not complete the study in one sitting) were also excluded due to inattention, 
leaving a final sample of 350 participants. 
Procedure 
Implicit person theory about moral character manipulation. This study used the same 
manipulation for implicit person theory as in earlier studies. Participants were randomly assigned 
to the fixed mindset or the growth mindset condition. They either read an article that presented 
arguments that moral character is fixed (fixed mindset condition) or that moral character can be 
developed (growth mindset condition). 
Reflection manipulation. The recall instructions from Study 3 rather than from Study 4 
were used. The reflection and the recounting conditions used the same writing prompts as in 
Studies 3 and 4. In the reflection condition, participants were given prompts to induce a deeper 
level of cognitive engagement (e.g., How are you learning from this?). In the recounting 
condition, participants were given prompts to induce a shallower level of cognitive engagement 
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(e.g., How long ago did the event happen?). The no reflection condition is the same as in Study 3 
and the control condition is the same as in Study 4. In the no reflection condition, participants 
were instructed to recall an event and were not given time to reflect on it. In the control 
condition, participants were instructed to recall a transgression but wrote about a different event 
(i.e., grocery shopping). 
Motivation to change. After the reflection manipulation, participants responded to the 
same measure of motivation to change (α = .89) as in earlier studies. 
Dependent variable: Likelihood of recidivism.  This study’s problem-solving task has 
been used in previous research to induce participants to cheat (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Vohs 
& Schooler, 2008; von Hippel, Lakin, & Shakarchi, 2005). The task involved eight different 
math and logic multiple-choice questions presented individually. Participants had 40 seconds to 
answer each question and could earn $0.25 for each correct answer. They were also told that the 
study had a programming glitch such that the correct answer would appear on their screen as 
they worked on each question unless they stopped it from being displayed by pressing the space 
bar right after the question appeared. They were also told that the research team would not be 
able to tell whether they had pressed the space bar, and that they should try to solve the problems 
on their own without looking at the answers. In fact, the programming glitch was just a cover 
story and I was able to record whether participants pressed the space bar or not.  
In contrast to the task in Study 4, which gave participants just one opportunity to cheat 
(i.e., over-reporting their score), the task in Study 5 gave participants multiple opportunities to 
cheat over a series of eight questions. To keep the analyses parallel with Study 4, I analyzed 
Study 5 participants’ cheating behavior at the task-level rather than question-level. Participants 
who looked at one or more correct answers (i.e., did not press the space bar at least once) were 
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coded as 1, and those who did not look at the correct answers during the task (i.e., pressed the 
space bar for all questions) were coded as zero.  
Finally, at the end of the problem-solving task, participants were asked to rate how 
difficult they found the questions (1 = not difficult at all, 7 = extremely difficult).  
Results 
Motivation to change. The results of the 2 × 4 study design are displayed in Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4. Interaction of Implicit Theory and Reflection on Motivation to Change in Study 5.  
 
Among participants in the control conditions, those in the growth mindset condition (M = 
4.90, SD = 1.18) and those in the fixed mindset condition (M = 4.94, SD = .99) did not differ in 
their motivation to change, F(1, 342) = .03, p = .88, η2p = .00. However, among participants in 
the no reflection conditions, those in the growth mindset condition (M = 5.41, SD = .96) reported 
significantly greater motivation to change those in the fixed mindset condition (M = 4.87, SD = 
1.41), F(1, 342) = 4.20, p = .04, η2p = .01. These results show support for Hypothesis 1 – in the 
no reflection conditions, those in the growth mindset condition were more motivated to change 
than those in the fixed mindset condition. These results also suggest that the lack of support for 
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Hypothesis 1 in Study 4 was possibly due to the design of the control condition. For instance, the 
prompts given to participants to write about a time they went grocery shopping could have 
introduced psychological dissonance that affected their responses to the implicit person theory 
about moral character manipulation. 
Among participants in the reflection conditions, those in the growth mindset condition (M 
= 4.66, SD = 1.41) and those in the fixed mindset condition (M = 4.57, SD = 1.43) did not differ 
in their motivation to change, F(1, 342) = .03, p = .87, η2p = .00. In addition, among participants 
in the recounting conditions, those in the growth mindset condition (M = 4.47, SD = 1.23) and 
those in the fixed mindset condition (M = 4.68, SD = 1.37) did not differ in their motivation to 
change, F(1, 342) = .77, p = .38, η2p = .00. Further planned comparison tests show that among 
participants in the fixed mindset conditions, those in the reflection condition reported 
significantly more motivation to change than those in the control condition, b = .47, SE = .23, t = 
2.03, p = .04, and those in the recounting condition reported marginally significantly more 
motivation to change than those in the control condition, b = .39, SE = .23, t = 1.72, p = .09. 
Overall, these results suggest that Hypothesis 2 was supported. Also, these results show that 
reflection was more influential than recounting at leading those in the fixed mindset conditions 
to increase their motivation to change. 
Likelihood of recidivism. To test Hypothesis 3, I used regression analyses (Table 3.2). 
Across all conditions, the average likelihood of recidivism was 66.0% (SD = .47). Even after 
controlling for how difficult participants found the problem-solving task, the relationship 
between motivation to change (M = 5.13, SD = 1.16) and likelihood of recidivism (M = .66, SD = 
.47) was not significant (b = .00, SE = .02, t = .01, p = .99, R
2
 = .00). Therefore, Hypothesis 3 
was not supported. 
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Table 3.2: Study 5 Regression Analyses. 
 DV = Likelihood of Recidivism 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
(Constant) 1.14 (.10)** 1.14 (.14) 
Task Difficulty -.09 (.02)** -.09 (.02)** 
Motivation to Change  .00 (.02) 
R
2
 .07** .07** 
ΔR2  .00 
** p <.01. 
 
Figure 3.5: Interaction of Implicit Person Theory and Reflection on Cheating in Study 5.  
 
As shown in Figure 3.5, there were no significant differences in likelihood of recidivism 
between participants in the growth mindset condition and those in the fixed mindset condition 
among participants in the recounting conditions, F(1, 342) = .15, p = .70, η2p = .00, no reflection 
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conditions, F(1, 342) = .18, p = .67, η2p = .00, and control conditions, F(1, 342) = 1.69, p = .19, 
η2p = .01. Interestingly, among participants in the reflection conditions, those in the fixed mindset 
condition (M = .51, SD = .51) had a significantly lower likelihood of recidivism than those in the 
growth mindset condition (M = .75, SD = .43), F(1, 342) = 5.95, p = .02, η2p = .02. Further 
planned comparison tests show that among participants in the fixed mindset conditions, those in 
the reflection condition (M = .51, SD = .51) had a significantly lower likelihood of recidivism 
than those in the recounting condition (M = .73, SD = .45), b = .22, SE = .10, t = 2.33, p = .02, 
and than those the no reflection condition (M = .68, SD = .48), b = .21, SE = .09, t = 2.25, p = 
.03. This suggests that in the fixed mindset conditions, reflection reduced participants’ likelihood 
of recidivism, but it was not their motivation to change that drove this effect. Other mechanisms 
could have driven the effect of reflection on likelihood of recidivism. For example, it is possible 
that in the fixed mindset conditions, reflection led to a heightened moral awareness (Reynolds, 
2006) or an emotional response (Haidt, 2003), which are independent and distinct from their 
motivation to change. That is, when those with a fixed mindset reflect on a past transgression, 
they could become more aware of the moral dimensions of their actions in general, which drives 
them to be less likely to commit any transgression (thus, not necessarily in relation to the idea of 
behavioral change). Alternatively, they might have an emotional reaction that drives them to be 
less likely to repeat their transgression (i.e., affective pathway rather than motivational pathway). 
Supplementary Analyses 
After participants rated their motivation to change, they responded to the same measures 
of lack of effort attributions (α = .55), lack of moral character attributions (α = .90), challenge 
appraisal style (α = .78) and threat appraisal style (α = .82) as in Study 4. Because of the low 
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reliability of the measure of lack of effort attributions, I conducted analyses on each item 
separately. 
Causal attributions. Analyses for lack of effort attributions were conducted on each item 
separately (i.e., lack of effort, lack of willpower) since the reliability of the two-item measure 
was less than .70. There were no significant differences in lack of effort attributions between the 
growth mindset and the fixed mindset condition, for those in the no reflection conditions, F(1, 
339) = .04, p = .84, η2p = .00, the recounting conditions, F(1, 339) = .30, p = .58, η
2
p = .00, and 
the reflection conditions, F(1, 339) = 1.37, p = .24, η2p = .00. However, for those in the control 
conditions, those in the growth mindset condition (M = 4.17, SD = 1.94) were significantly more 
likely to make lack of effort attributions than those in the fixed mindset condition (M = 3.30, SD 
= 1.80), F(1, 339) = 4.56, p = .03, η2p = .01. As for lack of willpower attributions, there were no 
significant differences between the growth mindset and the fixed mindset condition, for those in 
the control conditions, F(1, 338) = 1.78, p = .18, η2p = .01, the no reflection conditions, F(1, 338) 
= .69, p = .41, η2p = .00, the recounting conditions, F(1, 338) = 1.00, p = .32, η
2
p = .00, and the 
reflection conditions, F(1, 338) = .93, p = .34, η2p = .00. As for lack of ability attributions, there 
were no significant differences between the growth mindset and the fixed mindset condition, for 
those in the control conditions, F(1, 339) = .05, p = .83, η2p = .00, the no reflection conditions, 
F(1, 339) = .74, p = .11, η2p = .00, the recounting conditions, F(1, 339) = .00, p = .99, η
2
p = .00, 
and the reflection conditions, F(1, 339) = 1.06, p = .30, η2p = .00. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
causal attributions drive any of the results found in this study. 
Appraisal styles. As for appraisal styles, there were no significant differences in 
challenge appraisal style between the growth mindset and the fixed mindset condition, for those 
in the control condition, F(1, 341) = .93, p = .34, η2p = .00, the no reflection condition, F(1, 341) 
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= .07, p = .79, η2p = .00, the recounting condition, F(1, 341) = .10, p = .76, η
2
p = .00, and the 
reflection condition, F(1, 341) = .82, p = .37, η2p = .00. Similarly, there were no significant 
differences in lack of moral character attributions between the growth mindset and the fixed 
mindset condition, for those in the control condition, F(1, 341) = .03, p = .86, η2p = .00, the no 
reflection condition, F(1, 341) = .24, p = .63, η2p = .00, the recounting condition, F(1, 341) = .46, 
p = .50, η2p = .01, and the reflection condition, F(1, 341) = .19, p = .67, η
2
p = .00. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that appraisal styles drive any of the results in this study. 
Discussion 
Study 5 found support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, replicating the interaction pattern found in 
Study 3 but not Study 4. Among participants in the no reflection conditions, those in the growth 
mindset condition were more motivated to change than those in the fixed mindset condition. 
Furthermore, reflection led those in the fixed mindset conditions to increase their motivation to 
change, and this was more influential than mere recounting. In fact, among participants in the 
reflection conditions, there was no difference in motivation to change between those in the 
growth mindset condition and those in the fixed mindset condition.  
However, Study 5 did not find support for Hypothesis 3 regarding the link between 
motivation to change and likelihood of recidivism, even though support for this hypothesis was 
found in Study 4. Therefore, although a growth mindset and reflection can encourage 
transgressors’ motivation to change, this motivation does not necessarily have any implications 
for transgressors’ subsequent behavior in this one problem-solving task. The literature on 
learning motivation and academic performance might help explain this finding. Although several 
studies have found a link between motivation to learn and academic performance (e.g., 
Blackwell et al., 2007), a number of other studies have failed to observe any significant link 
relation between motivation to learn and academic performance (e.g., Harackiewicz, Barron, 
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Carter, Letho, & Elliot, 1997; Meece et al., 1988). In other words, even though individuals might 
be motivated to put in more effort to learn, this may not necessarily translate into actual results.  
Similarly, it is likely that the link between motivation to change and not repeating a 
transgression is not so clear-cut, and there could be boundary conditions influencing the strength 
of the link. For instance, the context of the subsequent transgression might matter. Comparing 
Study 4 and Study 5, on average, participants in Study 4 (M = .08, SD = .19) showed a much 
lower likelihood of cheating than those in Study 5 (M = .66, SD = .47).  While the problem-
solving task in Study 4 involved students at a top-ranked university adding pairs of numbers (i.e., 
simpler task), Study 5 involved regular working adults, who were not necessarily college 
educated, answering SAT-level geometry and calculus questions (i.e., more complex task). 
Furthermore, since participants in Study 5 completed the problem-solving task online and were 
not overseen by an experimenter, they may have felt less fearful about the punitive consequences 
of cheating. However, since participants in Study 4 completed their problem-solving task in a 
university-based lab and were overseen by lab staff, they may have been more mindful about the 
possibility of getting caught for cheating. In short, the contextual factors surrounding the 
subsequent behavior might influence the link between motivation to change and likelihood of 
recidivism. 
3.7 General Discussion 
Across the studies in this chapter, I find general support for Hypothesis 1 (with the 
exception of Study 4). Individuals with a growth mindset, either as a chronic predisposition or 
experimentally induced, are more likely than individuals with a fixed mindset to be motivated to 
change in the aftermath of wrongdoing. I also find general support for Hypothesis 2 (again, with 
the exception of Study 4). When individuals with a fixed mindset intentionally reflect on their 
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wrongdoing, they are just as likely as those with a growth mindset to be motivated to change. 
Specifically, they should reflect on deeper questions surrounding the event (e.g., Why did this 
happen? What can I learn from this?), rather than a mere recounting of the facts of the event. 
Reflecting on deeper questions forces individuals to cognitively engage with negative feedback 
stemming from their past transgression, which then motivates them to change for the better. 
Reflection is particularly useful for those with a fixed mindset, who may not necessarily 
automatically cognitively engage with negative feedback as they find such feedback personally 
threatening.  
I did not find support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 in Study 4. However, as discussed earlier, 
the null findings in Study 4 are possibly due to methodological limitations (i.e., poorly designed 
control condition). As seen in the results in Study 5, I do not find support for Hypothesis 1 about 
the main effect of implicit person theories about moral character among those in the control 
conditions, but I do find support for Hypothesis 1 among those in the no reflection conditions. 
Therefore, it is possible that the design of the control conditions in Study 4 introduced other 
confounding variables (e.g., dissonance), which affected participants’ motivation to change. 
Table 3.3: Summary of Hypotheses and Findings in Across Five Studies. 
Hypotheses Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 
H1 IPT  MTC Y Y Y N Y 
H2 Moderating role of reflection  - - Y N Y 
H3 MTC  Recidivism - - - Y N 
 
 
Note: IPT = Implicit person theory about moral character; MTC = Motivation to change;  
Y = Supported; N = Not supported. 
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In my earlier theorizing, I proposed that deep cognitive engagement with negative 
feedback occurs more automatically in those who believe that moral character can be developed, 
and that this cognitive engagement can also be deliberately structurally enabled through 
reflection. Therefore, cognitive engagement with negative feedback is the primary mechanism 
driving transgressors’ motivation to change. However, since I did not directly measure 
transgressors’ cognitive processing, it is possible that others mechanisms are driving 
transgressors’ motivation to change. For instance, the “processing” of information has been 
described as both cognitive and emotional in nature. Emotional processing is a process whereby 
individuals attempt to explore and understand their emotions, as well as regulate their emotions 
so that other experiences and behaviour can proceed without disruption (Rachman, 1980, 2001). 
In the aftermath of wrongdoing, transgressors may experience a multitude of emotions such as 
sadness, fear, anger, guilt, and shame. The effective processing of these emotions could play an 
important role in enhancing their motivation to change. Therefore, it is possible that those who 
believe that moral character can be developed have a stronger tendency to engage in emotional 
processing in the aftermath of wrongdoing, and that this emotional processing can be deliberately 
enabled through reflection. 
I found mixed support for Hypothesis 3. Motivation to change led to less cheating in 
Study 4, but it was not linked to cheating in Study 5. It seems that motivation to change can, but 
does not necessarily, lead to positive behavioral outcomes. Future research should explore the 
boundary conditions of the relationship between motivation to change and likelihood of 
recidivism. For example, the situational context of the subsequent behavior might matter. 
Motivation to change might only have a positive effect on transgressors’ behavior to the extent 
that transgressors find themselves in situations where the temptation to cheat is low, or where 
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there are punitive consequences for those who are caught cheating. In addition, self-regulation 
theory (Bandura, 1991; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989) suggests that several cognitive mechanisms 
might determine the transformation of motivational force into actual behavior. For instance, how 
individuals pay attention and monitor their own behavior, seek feedback from others, react to 
their past actions, and evaluate their future abilities, are all part of an ongoing self-regulation 
process that enable them to set their goals, modify their goals and achieve their goals (Kanfer & 
Kanfer, 1991). It is likely that many of these self-regulation mechanisms determine the extent to 
which transgressors’ motivation to change translates into actual behavioral change 
In conclusion, I found consistent support for a significant main effect of implicit person 
theory on motivation to change in the aftermath of wrongdoing. Furthermore, I found that 
motivation to change could be experimentally induced through a structured reflection 
intervention. However, it is still unclear if motivation to change has any impact on recidivism. 
More studies should be conducted to better understand the conditions under which motivation to 
change translates to a reduced likelihood of recidivism and when it does not. 
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Chapter 4: 
Concluding Remarks 
 
4.1 Theoretical Implications 
Behavioral ethics researchers have developed a robust literature on the individual and 
contextual factors influencing individuals’ wrongdoing (Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). In 
contrast to prior research’s focus on the antecedents of wrongdoing, my dissertation examines 
what happens in the aftermath of wrongdoing. Specifically, I examine transgressors’ cognitions 
in the aftermath of wrongdoing – their act-centered judgments, their person-centered judgments, 
and their motivation to change for the better. My work takes an important first step towards 
understanding transgressors’ cognitions as they reflect on and make sense of their wrongdoing.  
My dissertation also highlights the value of taking a person-centered approach to 
understanding how transgressors respond in the aftermath of wrongdoing. In Chapter 2, I found 
that transgressors’ moral self-evaluations matter for reducing recidivism. In Chapter 3, I found 
that transgressors’ mindsets about the malleability of moral character matters for their motivation 
to change in the aftermath of wrongdoing. Overall, my work answers the call for a more person-
centered approach in moral psychology to complement the existing act-centered approach 
(Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012). Virtue ethics philosophies (Aristotle, 4
th
 Century, B.C./2011) are 
known for their emphasis on moral character and the morality of the self. Therefore, the work 
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presented in my dissertation represents a re-emergence of early ideas related to moral character 
and the moral self. 
Overall, my dissertation underscores the importance of understanding recidivism as a 
dependent variable. Transgressions do not occur as isolated one-off incidents. In fact, 
transgressions may be viewed as part of an ongoing series of similar incidents. Therefore, it is 
not only important to understand how to reduce the likelihood of one-off transgressions, but also 
how to address problems of recidivism. Reducing recidivism not only helps to prevent minor 
workplace transgressions from escalating over time into major business scandals, there are 
broader societal implications as well. Today, offender recidivism is a social problem in many 
countries (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012). Research on recidivism in 
criminology suggests that the majority of offenders end up repeating their offenses (Durose, 
Cooper, & Snyder, 2014), including white-collar criminals (Murphy & Harris, 2007; Weisburd & 
Waring, 2001). My dissertation highlights the importance of transgressors’ cognitions in the 
aftermath of wrongdoing, and how these cognitions might influence their recidivism. 
4.2 Future Directions 
The research presented in this dissertation represents the beginning of a long-term 
research program on transgressors’ psychological responses in the aftermath of wrongdoing. I 
hope to continue building up this research program for the next five to ten years, or more. In the 
general discussions of Chapters 2 and 3, I already proposed some follow-up research studies that 
I hope to conduct to better understand the findings presented in this dissertation. Beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, there are many more research questions that I hope to answer.  
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In Study 1 of Chapter 2, I collected a rich archival dataset on athletes, their suspensions, 
and their public statements in the aftermath of those suspensions. In my dissertation, I used this 
dataset to explore the roles of act-centered and person-centered judgments in reducing 
recidivism. However, this same dataset could potentially be used to explore other questions 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. What other elements in athletes’ public statements might 
predict recidivism? Beyond athletes’ public statements, what individual characteristics (e.g., 
demographic characteristics, individual performance) or team characteristics (e.g., team 
performance, team culture, coach or manager characteristics) might predict their likelihood of 
getting suspended, or their likelihood of recidivism? 
In Chapter 3, I developed new materials to experimentally manipulate participants’ 
mindsets about moral character. I hope to conduct more studies to answer different research 
questions beyond the scope of this dissertation. For instance, how might one’s implicit person 
theories about moral character influence one’s reactions to others’ wrongdoing? For example, 
following previous work examining implicit person theories in the workplace context (Heslin, 
Latham, & VandeWalle, 2005), how might managers’ implicit person theories about moral 
character influence how they punish or forgive employees’ wrongdoing? Or how might 
employees’ implicit person theories about moral character influence how they respond to their 
manager’s wrongdoing?  
Overall, in my dissertation, I focused on reducing recidivism in the aftermath of 
wrongdoing. Moving forward, I hope to explore other positive responses that transgressors might 
display. For example, in the aftermath of wrongdoing, how might reflecting on their 
transgressions motivate transgressors to engage in generative behaviors (McAdams & de St. 
Aubin, 1992), such as advising others based on their experiences, or giving back to the 
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community? Also, my dissertation focused primarily on cognitive mechanisms (e.g., moral 
judgments, implicit person theories about moral character, cognitive engagement with negative 
feedback) linking individuals’ past transgressions to their future behavior. In future, it will be 
important to explore the affective or relational mechanisms influencing transgressors’ future 
behavior. How might transgressors’ emotional responses to their past transgressions (e.g., shame, 
guilt, pride, gratitude; Haidt, 2003; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007) influence their future 
behavior? How might the responses of the people around transgressors (e.g., their punitive or 
forgiving responses; Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006) influence transgressors’ future behavior? 
Although the theorizing in my dissertation focuses on the individual level – that is, how 
transgressors psychologically respond to their own transgressions – it might be interesting in 
future to explore how transgressors respond to their social group’s or their organization’s 
transgressions. Individuals are often embedded in organizational contexts, and these 
organizations are sometimes involved in corporate wrongdoing. Might positive employee 
behaviors emerge in light of corporate wrongdoing? For instance, when their organization is 
caught in an ethical scandal, employees may be motivated to engage in more prosocial or ethical 
behavior outside of work to morally compensate (Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009) for their 
involvement in the scandal as a member of the organization. Also, employees may be motivated 
to engage in whistle-blowing (Wellman, Mayer, Ong, & DeRue, 2016) or proactive behavior 
(Ong & Ashford, 2016) within the workplace to create positive change in their organization. It is 
likely that the relationship between corporate wrongdoing and employee behavior is influenced 
by both organizational and individual factors. Organizational factors, such as leaders’ responses 
to the wrongdoing (e.g., apology; Basford, Offermann, & Behrend, 2014), might influence 
employees’ behavior in the aftermath of corporate wrongdoing. Individual factors, such as the 
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employees’ organizational commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1991) or their cynicism towards change 
(DeCelles, Tesluk, & Taxman, 2013), might influence their behavior in the aftermath of 
corporate wrongdoing. 
Figure 4.1: Future Research Program 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Practical Implications 
 Overall, this research has implications for individuals who are interested in curbing their 
own recidivism, as well as individuals who are interested in helping others reduce their 
recidivism (e.g., managers disciplining employees).  
The first practical implication is that in the aftermath of wrongdoing, transgressors’ 
positive moral self-evaluations should be encouraged and their negative moral self-evaluations 
should be discouraged. For example, instead of internalizing their recent transgression, 
transgressors might remember times in the past when they behaved morally or when they were 
praised for being a good person, or they might interpret their recent transgression as an anomaly 
that does not represent their moral values. These positive moral self-evaluations will strengthen 
transgressors’ sense of efficacy with respect to not repeating their transgression, and therefore 
decrease their likelihood of recidivism.  
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The second practical implication is that transgressors should be encouraged to think in 
terms of a growth mindset – they should view their moral character as something that can be 
improved and developed over time. At least in the studies presented in Chapter 3, it appears that 
a growth mindset can be experimentally induced in a lab setting, with significant effects on 
participants’ motivation to change in the aftermath of wrongdoing. Longitudinal field research 
studies have successfully developed workshops and interventions to help both children 
(Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007) and adults (Heslin et al., 2006) cultivate a growth 
mindset with respect to their intelligence and ability. Using a similar approach, I expect that it 
will be possible to develop interventions to help individuals cultivate a growth mindset with 
respect to moral character and for them to maintain this mindset over time. 
Finally, transgressors should be encouraged to take time for reflection in the aftermath of 
wrongdoing. During this time of reflection, beyond considering the facts of the case, they should 
ask themselves questions like, “How am I learning from this?” and “How might I try to change?” 
Such questions will inspire their motivation to change, although the implications for actual 
recidivism remain unclear. Nevertheless, my dissertation research suggests that there is some 
element of truth in earlier philosophical theories suggesting that contemplation is the highest 
form of human activity (Aristotle, 4
th
 Century, B.C./2011; Plato, 4
th
 Century, B.C./2006). 
Individuals stand to benefit psychologically from more introspection and contemplation in the 
aftermath of wrongdoing.  
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